The lack of a ‘Joint Tasking System’.
The fundamental problem of inadequate command and control
processes in UNMISS is a systemic issue that arises from the
tasking process used in UN Integrated Mission. This problem
was caused due to the lack of a ‘joint tasking system’.
A successful example of the UN’s joint tasking process/mecha-
nisms can be seen in the implementation of the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) after the earth-
quake in 2010. In January 2010, the Joint Operations and Task-
ing Centre ( JOTC) was established in MINUSTAH Head-
quarters for the first time in UNPKO history. In fact, the JOTC
of MINUSTAH facilitated coordination with international
forces, and functioned as a central hub for tactical planning.
Since then, the JOTC has become the key operations center
providing a centralized entry point for humanitarian partners to
request assistance from MINUSTAH, while also coordinating
planning for MINUSTAH logistical and tactical support to the
humanitarian actors. The JOTC created an operational plan for
UN Forces using information collection efforts from external
actors. The JOTC conducted an operational assessment, and
then prioritized tasks to meet mission objectives. This institu-
tional response was effective in restoring security, providing for
recovery, and delivering humanitarian assistance immediately
after the major disaster event. 28
Some may offer the objection that the situation in Haiti was a
response to a natural disaster. However, the processes of collect-
ing information, conducting a needs assessment, prioritizing
efforts, and providing protection to other military assets re-
sponding to the crisis are all similar in nature to responding to
a civil disturbance. The JOTC gathers information and needs
from various actors such as the local government, UN Coun-
try Teams (UNCT), and humanitarian organizations, then
prioritizes them, and converts them into specific tasks for the
UN Mission. A series of these processes is managed by the joint
tasking system.
In UNMISS, as Figure-2 highlights, the JOC receive a request
from the Cluster in OCHA, and then the JOC transfers it to
U-9 Staff Branch. As such, the request cannot be assessed as
feasible within the capability of military forces until received by
the U-9 Staff Branch. The current processes for humanitarian
actors to request support must clear many coordination steps
before reaching the U-9 Staff Branch. This coordination flows
to determine priority and feasibility of a requests from the
civilian component by the military Force Headquarters greatly
delays the decision making process. This indicates that the joint
tasking civil-military integrated tasking system does not exist in
UNMISS. A single, joint/integrated tasking entity should be
established rather than having many centers with similar author-
ities. The MINUSTAH JOTC showed that the joint tasking
system would be more practical and realistic for the fulfillment
of mandates in an Integrated Mission like UNMISS.
The current mandates of UNPKOs are general in nature and
lack specificity. Consider the mandate of “Protection of Civil-
ians”, wherein the Security Council resolution directs UNPKOs
“to create conditions conducive to the deliv