Command & Control in the Integrated Mission
Within an Integrated Mission , the Force Commander exercises command and control over subordinate military units , while the Civilian Component Lead has command and control authority over all civilian and subordinate military sectors . Looking over the role of each component , the JOC coordinates daily mission activities , including military , governance , civil affairs , human rights , public information and other mission components . During crises , the JOC act as the Mission Crisis Management Centre . 14 The military U-3 Staff Branch deals with all matters concern-ing military operations to include preparing and coordinating fragmentary orders , warning orders and contingency plans . 15 Also the U-3 Staff Branch establishes the Military Operation Centre ( MOC ) in the Force Headquarters in order to control and execute operational activities . The UN guidelines indicate that the military component may co-locate its MOC with the JOC to ensure close coordination of daily activities together with the police and security centres . 16 On the civilian side , the primary organization responsible for the security of UN person-nel , equipment , and infrastructure is the Chief Security Advisor of the Security Section . ( See Figure-2 next page ) The Investigation Report highlighted a confusing arrangement of lines of authority , in combination with a lack of leadership on the ground , contributed to the incidents of poor performance among the military and police contingents . 17 Although these points are correct , as discussed above , information management , and command and control structures in the Integrated Mission has many ‘ centres ’ with overlapping and duplicating functions
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and roles . This Integrated Mission structure causes decentralization of command and control lines , thus making it difficult to define clear areas of responsibility , resulting in competing orders and instruction by each component . In the July crisis , the Investigation Report pointed out that despite the UNMISS JOC ’ s efforts working through the night on plans for launching a quick-reaction force at first light , no team was deployed , 18 highlighting issues within the command & control function .
During crisis response operations , the JOC and Force Headquarters conduct command and control functions differently . From a military perspective , the civilian component should not be able to task military forces and issue orders for military troops without first conducting deliberate coordination with the Force Headquarters . Specifically , the U-3 Staff Branch would need to coordinate the tasking process in the Mission Headquarters . The Investigation Report criticized this process wherein , “… the Force did not operate under unified command , resulting in multiple and sometimes conflicting orders to the troop contingents . 19 Military components also did not operate under a unified command and control structure . The centers responsible for security and safety in fact issued multiple confusing orders to the military force for dealing with the crisis . These conflicting orders occurred due to the decentralized command structure and the competing nature of civilian component and military tasking functions .
The UNMISS Force Commander had no tasking authority for command and control of the military engineering troop and aviation unit ( see Figure-2 above ), since they are under the com-