hensive theory for CA makes planning CAO difficult , resulting in misunderstandings within the Army and the CA community on its purpose . This has led to the perception that CA is only a maneuver enabler or a post-conflict force used to rebuild a nation and transition it to civil authority . 43 A solution to this problem can be found in specifying a clearly defined role for CA .
This can be done by adding Operational Preparation of the Environment ( OPE ) to the list of CA core tasks . In Joint Publication 1-02 , OPE is defined as the conduct of activities in potential areas of operation , with the intent to prepare and shape the operational environment . 44 CA currently has many core tasks , such as Populace and Resource Control ( PRC ), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ( FHA ), Civil Information Management ( CIM ), National Assistance ( NA ), and Support to Civil Administration ( SCA ). However , none of these tasks clearly convey CA ’ s actual role in Phase 0 . This is concerning when the purpose of CA is to secure a strategic advantage for the United States , prevent future conflicts , and shape the environment for potential operations . Including OPE as a core task far more accurately describes CA engagement operations than NA or SCA do .
Another way to institute CA ’ s effectiveness in Phase 0 is by incorporating specific tactical skills in CA training . This has the benefit of increasing the survivability and operational effectiveness of CA teams working in Phase 0 . For CA officers to effectively contribute to Phase 0 efforts , they must be experienced , highly skilled , language proficient , and regional experts . The current training system does not provide such training . The absence of this has continually resulted in a shortage of qualified CA personnel .
National Guard Special Forces developed a recruitment and training program , which could be adopted to assist in finding the best CA candidates . First , the National Guard removed the Reserve Component training pipeline , and mandated all Special Forces soldiers attend the same Special Forces Qualification ( Q ) Course . 45 To increase selection success rates , reserve component Special Forces units created training detachments to assess and prepare recruits for the Q course . These programs included preliminary tests to assess recruits , followed by a training program to prepare them for assessment and selection . Many recruits performed very well attaining a 90 percent selection rate at times . Second , the National Guard recruited Special Forces qualified soldiers leaving active duty . 46 These methods have allowed the National Guard to maintain numbers and preparedness through its continuous deployments .
Restructuring CA recruitment and training in these ways is certainly possible . The Army should review these National Guard programs and develop recruitment and training programs that work for their needs . By utilizing similar practices , an active duty training pipeline can be introduced to Army Reserve Component soldiers , thereby boosting the number of CA forces . Doing this will resolve two problems that impair the implementation of Phase 0 operations : numbers and preparedness . Presently there is a personnel shortage within the active Army CA organization which interferes with its ability to effectively staff , let alone expand operations . By revitalizing recruitment and training efforts , the Army will be able to not only resolve this shortage , but can equip its new staff with the skills necessary for Phase 0 support .
Conclusion
The new Army Operating Concept has identified the future operational environment of CA work as complex . 47 By emphasizing CAO in Phase 0 , the focus of operations shifts to dealing with unstable conditions before they become a problem , avoiding large scale deployments that can be costly in both human life and resources . This new ambition requires experts who can operate in complex environments and cooperate with civilian and military partners . CA supported Phase 0 become more tenable by recruiting and training units with the proper language , regional expertise , and specialized skills . The CA community ’ s greatest shortfall in preventing future conflict is education . The CA force can resolve its understaffing and unpreparedness by reestablishing a SOMG and expanding educational efforts . In a resource constrained security environment , the need for regional experts who can operate in complex environments and cooperate with civilian populations has never been more urgent .
PKSOI SME Review by COL Jay Liddick Mr . Ferry captures some important points in this paper . However , I would like to add clarification on two issues . First , while the U . S . military has grappled with how to deal with " CA related issues ” since the colonial era , the U . S . military did not use the term or develop dedicated CA capability until WW II . Thus , Civil Affairs is a relatively new branch in the Army , and it did not become an active duty branch until October 2006 . Secondly , the limited amount of act-ive component Civil Affairs capability ( five special opera-tions battalions and one general purpose battalion ) limits availability of readily available CA teams and companies for persistent GCC phase zero operations . Not addressed in the paper is the fact that the current active component assessment and selection and training
32