ing for military). Weighing the risk of creating an “advising”
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) that produces an ex-
pertly-skilled advisor short on subject matter expertise (SME),
Professional Military Education tiered over a potential advis-
or’s career progression, could not only identify individuals with
the disposition to succeed as advisors, but also encourage a cul-
tural paradigm shift to avoid “just in time” training.
Deviation from training standards runs the risk of devaluing
the required training standards, however requirements could
be waived for an immediate reporting need. Any training wai-
ver trend could force overreliance on the experience and perso-
nality of the incoming advisor. To address this in a systematic
manner, former advisors from the US Reserve Forces and civ-
ilian government professionals could form an advisor founda-
tion, which could be relied upon to bridge the gaps while new
advisors develops their capability and capacity. A concurrent
recommendation would be to institutionalize advisor assignm-
ent incentives, such as promotion or billet requirements. Dur-
ing the development of potential senior level advisors, promo-
tions become contingent on the completion of training and
education requirements, thus avoiding "just in time" training,
or the selection of the “most convenient” individual. Further-
more, the failure to complete threshold advisor training would
become a bar to advisor duties or other advancement. While
this progression-based training cannot address all aspects of
advisor training, it would succeed in identifying those indivi-
duals that could succeed at the type of desired advising miss-
ions and tasks, while also allowing for focused pre-deployment
and on-board training.
3. Standardize E-G-O requirements (demand signal)
for linkage to training requirements
An advisory effort does not solely rely on the individual advisor,
but on the entire advisor infrastructure. The E-G-O construct
is a means for planner to consider the entire advising
infrastruc-ture as those respective US Government entities
organize, train, and equip their forces. Any advising effort
should not be viewed in a vacuum as one discreet effort, but
viewed as an integrated effort in the big picture, specifically its
support for other efforts, and its required support from higher
echelons. The E-G-O construct represents the Executive,
Generating, and Operating Functions of any organization, and
actually applies at each of level, focusing on discreet activities
within the organization. The ability of subordinate or
supporting units to effectively align their efforts is hampered
without a clear and understandable “top-bottom “ advisor
mission (or a clear understanding of how the advisor mission
supports the regional strategy). The challenge is to determine
the requisite amount
24
of mission intent and direction to adequately direct the advisor
mission from above, while ensuring that all mission require-
ments are characterized from the lowest levels as well, such as
ensuring systems are sustainable by the host nation.
The advisor planning process, guided by clear mission intent
and direction, compels planners to focus towards a horizon
where an advisor endstate succeeds at working the US out of
their advisor role. All advising actions could then be directed to
supporting a partner nation’s systems, which they would be able
to sustain on their own without further US intervention, essen-
tially developing a partner nation sustainable system vice an un-
sustainable US solution. Training and education standards can-
not be adequately planned and organized unless advisor mission
requirements (demand signal) are properly identified and stan-
dardized (at the Operating, Generating, and Executive Func-
tions). Without this complete and multileveled planning view,
there is risk in the creation of conjectural training standards
vice a systematic advising standard and framework that supports
the accomplishment of the advising goal. At the Operating
Function of advising, the Geographic Combatant Command
(GCC) Security Cooperation force structure must be organized
to properly plan, manage, and implement the advising mission,
which should all be based on the partner nation E-G-O advisee
requirements. Such a mirrored E-G-O construct will not only
better position the GCC to recognize mission requirements,
but also the advising responsibilities that could be better addre-
ssed by external entities. To ensure US unified action, the advi-
sing structure at the GCC should be mirrored and aligned with
the Service and Joint Staff headquarters to ensure the planning,
management, and implementation of the advising mission is
conducted as responsively, but practically, as possible. Such a
construct would require intensive coordination, and could
result in micromanagement from higher headquarters, thus
delegation of responsibility must be pushed to the lowest levels.
Conclusion
With the 2017 National Defense Authorization act and other
related efforts, the US advisor mission is headed in the right
direction, and positioned to refine the implementation of the
advisor mission. With the creation of the Security Cooperation
Framework and the Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation
program for Security Cooperation. Advising will benefit from
the internal review of advising processes and procedures. The
forthcoming Security Cooperation Work Force Development
program will professionalize the force to recognize the challeng-
es ahead. With this understanding of the operational environ-
ment of the advisor mission, the working group put forth fun-
damental consideration for the advising framework. To address
the training and education gap for senior level advisors requires