Introduction
Over the last several months , there has been intense dialogue between the Department of State , Department of Defense , and the U . S . Agency for International Development ( often referred to as the 3-Ds ), about how best to learn from past stabilization efforts in order to prepare for future challenges . This dialogue has thus far resulted in the joint transition paper “ Sustainable Stability :” A Feasible Future for U . S . Stabilization Efforts , a tabletop exercise , Pocket Aces , and continues to generate discussion between and within the three agencies . While critical guidance , such as the revision of DoD Directive 3000.05 Stability Operations policy is not yet complete , these agencies ’ training communities have a critical need to understand current thinking on stabilization , in order to adapt our efforts accordingly and provide the best possible preparation for those who will be deploying to carry out US government policies and programs . This WG provided a forum for the training community to listen in on the conversation and begin to grapple with the implications of a new approach to stabilization .
The United States approach to stabilization continues to shift away from comprehensive , whole-of-government / whole-of-society , large-footprint , long-duration intervention , toward highly focused , selective engagements . These new engagement conditions emphasize the primacy of political solutions in tandem with interim security measures , while leveraging partnerships with local institutions and international counterparts , during critical windows of time . As policy , doctrine , and extant practice shift , education and training approaches must keep pace . This WG discussed current and anticipated stabilization challenges and factors for success in light of the coming shift in policy , in order to identify the knowledge , skills , and abilities needed for future stabilization curricula .
Objectives of Work Group 3
There were four objectives : 1 ) enhance shared understanding of sustainable stability ; 2 ) identify key audiences and core components of stabilization training applicable across the community ; 3 ) develop a list of learning objectives and tools for use in stabilization training , such as exercises , case studies , and KSAs ; and 4 ) outline next steps for design and implementation of curricula .
What WG 3 Discussed
The work group began with a 3-D panel of representatives from State ’ s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations ( CSO ), USAID ' s Office of Transition Initiatives , and OSD ( P ) SHA , to set the stage for the discussion . Panelists described lessons from their agency and current thinking about how the USG should approach stabilization . They elaborated on the roles proposed in the Transition Paper , and highlighted key principles for focusing efforts in the future . State leads , DOD supports , and USAID implements US stabilization efforts .
Aditi Gorur ’ s definition of stabilization captured a core principle of the approach : “ supporting the transfer of territorial control from spoilers to legitimate authorities .” 1 Above all , stabilization requires a prioritized and focused response based on a firm assessment of the conflict at hand . The three primary and consistent issues to address in stabilization efforts are political consolidation , security , and humanitarian assistance . Any other priorities must be justified based on context . This does not diminish the importance of other considerations , but makes a distinction between institution-building and the immediate need to establish stability in which longer-term stabilization efforts can proceed .
After setting the groundwork , the working group broke into small groups to examine four historical case studies in light of the concepts proposed in the 3-D panel discussion . Those case studies were East Timor ( 1999-2002 ), Liberia ( 2003-2005 ), El Salvador ( 1980-1992 ), and Colombia ( 1998-2011 ).
The groups addressed the following questions for each case study :
• To what extent did international intervention efforts focus on intervening during a window of instability ?
• How was the political crisis addressed ? Was political consolidation a priority ?
• How did local and international stakeholders work in partnership ?
• What other stabilization issues were prioritized ?
• What were the main gaps ?
• Were they able to transition from an “ acute ” stabilization crisis to more “ sustainable stability ”?
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