determine the required capability and capacity for U.S.
defense efforts; and 3) a clear review of interagency/interation-
al support that may inform whether U.S. defense efforts are
ineffective or redundant.
The WG reviewed a Case Study (or scenario) to determine
potential gaps in endstate, planning or execution. The WG
provided recommendations for senior leader identification,
training and guidance within the EGO function construct.
The deliverables were a proposed SC/SFA framework to
understand interagency coordination gaps; a recommended
structure, policy, procedure for SC/SFA implementation; and
training and education advising requirements for implemnt-
ation by particular senior leaders and organizations.
Stability Policy Update
Colonel (COL) Aaron Reisinger opened the conference with
a stability policy update. COL Reisinger is a former strategist
within the Stability and Humanitarian Affairs office of Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict at the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
COL Reisinger acknowledged DoD has an existing hangover
with stability operations largely due to the current policy
statement DoDI 3000.05, which his office is responsible for. In
the policy statement, Stabilization is defined too broadly and
focuses too much on large scale, long duration and very expen-
sive engagements. History shows that combat and stabilization
activities occur concurrently and can be conducted on a very
small scale, both with or without DoD. Victory will be tem-
porary in any combat operations without the consolidation of
gains through stability activities. Despite the five key aspects of
a sustainable stabilization framework (security, military sup-
port, public order, provision of immediate needs, and support
economic and governmental stability), stabilization still does
not have an agreed upon, across-the-board framework. Without
a clearly articulated definition of stability as a way to achieve
national security objectives in policy and concept documents,
the service components cannot develop specific capabilities
to meet the stabilization needs. The policy statement needs to
further refine the core capabilities necessary for the joint force
to conduct stability activities.
The new policy statement will limit Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance (FHA) to a single line, in order to bifurcate FHA
from stabilization, so that FHA is seen as a needs-based activity,
while stabilization is a political-based activity. This change does
not undermine DoD’s legal and moral perspective to provide
for the immediate needs of a population as an occupying force.
Another policy concern was that Security and Rule of Law
Keynote speaker Mr. Patrick Dulin works the crowd
during a question and answer session.
definitions were confusing. Security will remain a terrain-based
activity providing internal and border security, so people and
goods can move freely throughout the country. Security Ac-
tivities are DoD’s primary function, and foster a sufficiently
peaceful environment, allowing for the conduct of all other
stability tasks. Where as, Rule of law predominantly is military
support to Public Order, known as Transitional Public
Security (TPS). TPS entails not only basic protection of
civilians and property, but also the introduction of large-scale,
policing, judiciary and corrections system development.
Pointing out the challenges within the USG machinery, DOD’s
transfer of mission authority to the State Department is often
less than efficient. However, the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense is making strides to create greater efficiency in this process.
During the question and answer phase, topics such as inter-
agency problems and a lack of across the board coordination
were broached. Isolating objectives is vital in stabilization
efforts and policy development. These objectives need to be
drawn in accordance with internal and external interests, while
leveraging external experts to help solve current challenges
facing PSO.
Keynote Speaker
This year’s keynote speaker was Patrick Dulin, who serves as the
executive director of the Mission Support Directorate, Defense
Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Dulin’s portfolio in-
cludes Performance Based Logistics and Management Support.
Mr. Dulin pointing out that Operational Contract Support
(OCS) is a highly valuable tool for ensuring the synchroniza-
tion of contracts. Problems will arise if OCS is not conducted
effectively, even with a thorough contract oversight mechan-
ism. To illustrate this, in Kyrgyzstan, despite implemented
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