Peace & Stability Journal Volume 7, Issue 1 - Page 9

Key Stabilization Tasks
Assuming this post-collapse scenario plays out as a new major power rivalry , it will be critical for South Korea and its key allies to work out a division of labor and areas of responsibility with China ( and possibly Russia ) preferably through the United Nations Security Council but more likely via a Six-Party Talks framework . South Korea and the United States will need to offer hard transactional trade-offs that provide adequate security assurances to China in return for its acquiescence on unifica ¬ - tion . For emerging North Korean leaders , the socio-economic weight of South Korean and international aid , coupled with co-equal integration , may be enough to bring in most , if not all of North Korea . The international focus group in concert with whatever North Korean authorities quickly emerge will face several key stabilization challenges in security , humanitarian assistance , justice , economic infrastructure , and governance . Key stabilization tasks in order of priority include :
Near Term
1 . Weapons security . China is best situated to win the race to control North Korea ’ s nuclear , chemical , and biological weapons . Most of these facilities are closer to China and the relevant North Korean military units may be more disposed to China than others such as South Korea , the U . S ., Russia , and , most certainly , Japan . Since both geography and political links appear to put China at point on this stabilization task , multi-party talks should seek agreement with China on the rules of engagement with North Korean Army units in the event of a Kim collapse , the procedures for reporting and securing the weapons , and the verification of their final disposition . In this regard , China may actually prefer to work with the U . S . rather than risk South Korea “ inheriting ” North Korea ’ s weapons . Ultimately , all parties should commit to implementing a denuclearized Korean peninsula , a long-standing goal of the International Community .
2 . Humanitarian aid . North Korea ’ s collapse will confront South Korea and international actors with the world ’ s greatest humanitarian disaster . More than half of North Korea ’ s total 25-million population is estimated to suffer from malnutrition . A third of North Korean children under five evince substandard growth , particularly in rural areas . Chronic diarrhea is the leading cause of infant death due to inadequate sanitation . Shipments of food , medicine and potable water will demand a large-scale logistics plan and contributions from the International Community . 3 . Displaced population camps . North Korea ’ s most vulnerable populations are likely to migrate south where they will expect to find not only badly needed humanitarian aid but also the provision of medical help , housing , and education services . This will require the rapid installation of displaced person camps .
4 . Peacekeeping and Policing . North Korean territory may initially host a number of internal conflict groups that are attempting to seize financial assets , armories , supply depots , and ports . Many of these military and security units may strongly resist South Korean or Western soldiers . Multi-party talks will need to carve out areas of responsibility for the international actors involved and establish relocation procedures to separate conflict groups and facilitate peacekeeping and policing actions by foreign troops . In particular , the talks must reach quick agreement on the disarmament and / or demobilization of artillery units close to the border with South Korea .
5 . Export inspections . In the immediate aftermath of a collapse , international actors will need to maintain and tighten vigilance on North Korean export shipments . These shipments may contain nuclear materials or financial assets that rogue elements are seeking to remove from the country .
Medium Term
6 . Governance . The United Nations Security Council or , short of that , key Six-Party Talks countries should attempt to foster the formation of a transitional governmental system aiming to avoid repartition of the country . Such a system , pursued in the wake of the collapse of the Kim Family franchise , has daunting odds stacked against it because it assumes diverse segments of North Korean society will find mutual benefits in a South-Korean-dominated political system . In this light , international actors should pursue a federal parliamentary system as opposed to a powerful chief-executive-led system . The U . S . and South Korea should avoid advocating a centralized system for the obvious reason it resembles the Kim family past , retards the development of checks-and-balances , and impedes the introduction of greater accountability and transparency .
7 . Rule of Law and Police . Long before any formal ratification of an inter-Korean justice system ( preferably under a unified constitutional arrangement ), new North Korean leaders will need to consider a partnership with international policing units to enforce order . As these talks unfold with emerging North Korean leaders , South Korea and the U . S . will have a strong interest in promoting a law enforcement partnership that is consistent with the principle of a unified Korea . North Korean officials and troops involved

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Key Stabilization Tasks Assuming this post-collapse scenario plays out as a new major power rivalry, it will be critical for South Korea and its key allies to work out a division of labor and areas of responsibility with China (and possibly Russia) preferably through the United Nations Security Council but more likely via a Six-Party Talks framework. South Korea and the United States will need to of- fer hard transactional trade-offs that provide adequate security assurances to China in return for its acquiescence on unifica¬- tion. For emerging North Korean leaders, the socio-economic weight of South Korean and international aid, coupled with co-equal integration, may be enough to bring in most, if not all of North Korea. The international focus group in concert with whatever North Korean authorities quickly emerge will face several key stabilization challenges in security, humanitarian as- sistance, justice, economic infrastructure, and governance. Key stabilization tasks in order of priority include: Near Term 1. Weapons security. China is best situated to win the race to control North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Most of these facilities are closer to China and the relevant North Korean military units may be more disposed to China than others such as South Korea, the U.S., Russia, and, most certainly, Japan. Since both geogra- phy and political links appear to put China at point on this stabilization task, multi-party talks should seek agreement with China on the rules of engagement with North Korean Army units in the event of a Kim collapse, the procedures for reporting and securing the weapons, and the verification of their final disposition. In this regard, China may actually prefer to work with the U.S. rather than risk South Korea “inheriting” North Korea’s weapons. Ultimately, all parties should commit to implementing a denuclearized Korean peninsula, a long-standing goal of the International Com- munity. 2. Humanitarian aid. North Korea’s collapse will confront South Korea and international actors with the world’s great- est humanitarian disaster. More than half of North Korea’s total 25-million population is estimated to suffer from malnutrition. A third of North Korean children under five evince substandard growth, particularly in rural areas. ) ɽɡ́ѡ͔ЁѠՔѼ)ՅєͅхѥḾ)х݅ѕȁݥɝ͍ѥ́)ɥѥ́ɽѡ%ѕɹѥ չ(̸ձѥ̸9Ѡ-ɕéЁձȴ)ձѥ́ɔѼɅєͽѠݡɔѡݥ)ЁѼЁ䁉䁹յхɥ)ͼѡɽ٥ͥͥՍѥ)͕٥̸Q́ݥɕեɔѡɅхѥ)ͽ̸(иAA9Ѡ-ɕѕɥѽ)䁥ѥ䁡ЁյȁѕɹЁɽ́ѡ)ɔѕѥѼ͕锁͕̰ɵɥ̰)̸̰5䁽ѡ͔х䁅͕ɥ)չ́ɽɕͥЁMѠ-ɕȁ]ѕɸͽ̸)5ձѤх́ݥѼٔЁɕ́ɕ)ͥ䁙ȁѡѕɹѥѽ́ٽٕх͠)ɕѥɽɕ́Ѽ͕ɅєЁɽ́)хєѥ́䁙ɕɽ̸)%ѥձȰѡх́ЁɕեɕЁѡ)ͅɵЁȁѥѥչ͔́)ѼѡɑȁݥѠMѠ-ɕ(ԸЁѥ̸%ѡєѕɵѠ)͔ѕɹѥѽ́ݥѼх)ѥѕ٥9Ѡ-ɕЁ̸͡Q͔)́͡䁍хՍȁѕɥ́ȁ͕)ѡЁɽՔ́ɔ͕Ѽɕٔɽѡչ)5մQɴ(ظٕɹQUѕ9ѥ́Mɥ չȰ)͡ЁѡаMAQ́չɥ́͡ձѕ)ѼѕȁѡɵѥɅͥѥٕɹх)ѕѼٽɕѥѥѡչ丁MՍ)ѕՕѡ݅ѡ͔ѡ-)䁙Ʌ͔́չѥ́хЁЁ͔)յٕ͔͕́́9Ѡ-ɕͽݥ)Յ́MѠ-ɕѕѥ̴)ѕ%ѡ́аѕɹѥѽ́͡ձՔ)Ʌɱхѕ͕́Ѽݕəհ)ѥٔѕQTLMѠ-ɕ͡ձٽ)ٽѥɅ镐ѕȁѡ٥́ɕͽ)ɕ͕́ѡ-аɕхɑ́ѡٕ)̵̰́ѡɽՍѥ)ɕѕȁչх䁅Ʌɕ(ܸIձ1܁A1ɔ䁙ɵɅѥ)ѥѕȵ-ɕѥѕɕɅչ)չѥѥɅФ܁9Ѡ-ɕ)́ݥѼͥȁѹ͡ݥѠѕɹ)ѥչ́Ѽɍɑȸ́ѡ͔х́չ)ݥѠɝ9Ѡ-ɕ̰MѠ-ɕѡ)TLݥٔɽѕɕЁɽѥ܁ɍ)Ёѹ͡ѡЁ́ͥѕЁݥѠѡɥ)չ-ɕ9Ѡ-ɕ́ɽ́ٽٕ(