Peace & Stability Journal Special 25th Anniversary Edition | Page 9

From left to right: AUSA President and former AFRICOM Commander GEN (R) Carter Ham, USAWC Commandant MG John Kem, former Deputy Commanding General to AFRICOM VADM (R) Michael Franken, and Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Brunssum, GEN Riccardo Marchiò. Photo by Chris Browne, PKSOI case of Georgia is central to NATO strategy; the foundation with Georgia is very strong. NATO should consider admit- ting Georgia immediately to send a message to President Putin that he does not get to veto the sovereignty of states, or to get a separate Russian sphere of interest. The political situation has to be right and Georgia has to be ready. The best option would have been to introduce rotational forces into Georgia immedi- ately after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Georgia is building a deep sea port in Anaklia, which will be the primary Black Sea “Silk Road” port connecting China to the European trade community, thus greatly enhancing Georgia’s economic value. The Anaklia port alone should emphasize the need for NATO rotational forces in Georgia to prevent future Russian incur- sions. A continued Georgian shortfall is a lack of a Coast Guard for Black Sea security. NATO territory on the pretense of defending a Russian minori- ty population. Russia does not follow a truly hybrid warfare or Gerasimov doctrine, but instead, adheres to a classic Russian misinformation campaign, including manipulating troop move- ment numbers. If the U.S. were to permanently base troops in Poland, such an action would elicit a Russian response, likely pushing troops into Belarus. For such an action, the U.S. must conduct this action with the support of NATO. Any perceived action to provoke Russia must understand that Russia only respects strength in numbers and equipment. Russia dominates the information space, a component of their misinformation campaign. Thus, the U.S. and NATO must greatly enhance their narrative, focusing on Russia’s wrongdoings. • When the US calls for NATO partners to provide more than their required 2%, NATO needs to consider incentivizing part- ners to give more, which may not be in funds. NATO needs to create a formula that counts infrastructure improvement/expan- sion that has demonstrable military value (railway, bridges, etc.). Germany provides an excellent example. Rather than provide more tanks, they could dedicate rail assets to better move NATO equipment and troops to target areas in the Baltics and Poland. • Russia has no desire to take on the 29 countries of NATO, and resents and fears NATO cohesion most of all. The goal of many Russian activities are to wreck the international order and challenge the cohesion of the alliance. Russia’s strategic aim against NATO is to demonstrate the alliance cannot adequately defend member states. If Russian leaders believe this objective has been achieved, then they might miscalculate and invade 7