Peace & Stability Journal Special 25th Anniversary Edition | Page 41

Fully Integrated Missions A second radical strategic shift would be to alter the typical arrangement of UN organizations in a host state. Usually, the Head of Mission is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), while the UN’s humanitarian and devel- opment organizations that comprise the UN country team (UNCT) fall under the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (HC/RC), as shown in the figure on page 38. The UNCT is not subordinate to the peacekeeping mission, although the HC/RC often wears another hat as one of the two Deputy SRSGs in the mission. While this arrangement is common practice in an “integrated” mission, the Deputy SRSG (HC/RC) has limited practical ability to fuse the peacekeeping mission and the UNCT. An alternate structure, used in many special political missions, is to place all UN assets under a single Executive Representative to the Secretary General (ERSG). This would provide better “delivery as one” (or “unity of effort”) and allow flexibility when circumstances require a change in priorities, such as from establishing security to peacebuilding, and the execution of sequenced mandates. Military and police components would likely better accomplish mandated peacebuilding tasks (such as “support” security sector reform or “support” humanitarian assistance) when the Head of Mission (the ERSG) has actual responsibility for these efforts. Neither transitional authority mandates, nor the idea of a com- pletely integrated mission garner much support in UN circles. They are contrary to the UN’s normal way of doing business and would incur a responsibility burden that, frankly, no one wants to assume from the host state. However, they would be more appropriate in failed states, when a UN mission must accom- plish a shifting combination of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and conflict prevention. It is hard to see how these measures would be inferior to the cur- rent situation in which peacekeeping missions are in danger of being devoured by their challenges, like the prey in the opening picture. About the Author: Dwight Raymond joined PKSOI in July 2009 after retiring from the Army as an Infantry Colonel. His military assignments included infantry leadership, command, and staff positions; faculty positions at the United States Military Academy and the US Army War College, theater-lev- el plans positions, and training and advisory assignments at the National Training Center and in Iraq as a Brigade Mili- tary Transition Team (MiTT) Chief. His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, and Combat Infantryman’s Badge. Dwight has a Bachelors Degree from the United States Military Academy and Masters Degrees from the University of Maryland, the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and the United States Army War College. Notes: Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz and William R. Phillips. Report on Enhancing the Safety and Security of Peacekeepers (New York: The United Nations, December 2017). 2 High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Part- nership and People (New York: The United Nations, 16 June 2015), 11-14. 3 Antonio Guterres, Summary of Initiatives Undertaken by the Secretariat to Strengthen United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: The United Nations, 28 March 2018). 4 See Aditi Gorur, Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions (Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Center, December 2016) for discussion of different interpretations of “stabiliza- tion” in the context of UN peacekeeping. 5 See Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook (New York: The United Nations, December 2013), 38-39. 1 39