Peace & Stability Journal Special 25th Anniversary Edition | Page 39

An image circumnavigating the internet depicts a chicken fleeing for its life from a rampaging tiger. Forced to choose, most would prefer to be the tiger, although in some instances we might identify more closely with the chicken. Metaphorical- ly, when the United Nations elects to establish a peacekeeping mission in a fragile state, one would hope that the tiger would symbolize the collective weight of the international community and be up to the challenge. Too often, though, the most that can be said is that—bad as things might be with a peacekeeping mission present—things would be far worse if the mission were absent. Like the bird in the picture, peacekeeping missions are typically overwhelmed by their complex environments, rather than the other way around. There have been many notable calls for improvement in UN peacekeeping. The most significant of these are the Brahimi Report, the New Horizons for Peacekeeping, and three more recent efforts: the High Level Independent Panel for Peace Operations (HIPPO) report, the Cruz Report, and the Sec- retariat’s current Action for Peacekeeping initiative (A4P). These studies have advocated improvement in numerous areas including mandates, bureaucratic efficiency, training, doctrine, the protection of civilians, leadership, technology, and conduct (especially related to sexual exploitation and abuse—SEA). The HIPPO report called for four essential shifts: • Politics must drive design and implementation of peace operations. • The full spectrum of UN peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground. • Stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnerships are needed. • The UN Secretariat must become more field-focused, and UN peace operations must be more people-centered. The recent Cruz Report argued that military components should be more assertive, because passivity only encourages spoilers to act against the UN mission. This observation applies both to the protection of UN assets, which are increasingly tar- geted, as well as to the protection of civilians. The Cruz Report advocated for many specific recommendations such as the de- centralization of casualty evacuation and medical evacuation to give field commanders more control and make these procedures more responsive. The Secretary General’s A4P initiative was launched on 28 March 2018 and is an emerging set of collec- tive measures organized around the “four Ps” (people, politics, partnerships, and performance). While the initiative is still under development, it includes topics such as enhancing safety, security, performance and leadership; conduct, discipline, and human rights; and reviewing the state of UN missions. Whether peacekeeping is an appropriate tool in today’s conflict zones is a legitimate topic for debate. Contemporary missions often straddle the gray area between peacekeeping and other types of peace operations, especially “peace enforcement” and “peacebuilding.” “Robust peacekeeping” generally applies to situations where a peacekeeping mission is likely to confront lo- cal armed combatants for self-protection or to protect civilians. UN peacekeeping missions increasingly include in their titles the terms “multidimensional” (military, civilian, and police components with more than a simple peacekeeping mandate), “integrated” (some formal connection, however limited, be- tween the UN mission and the UN country team of human- itarian and development organizations) and “stabilization” (a generally vague term subject to interpretation ). 37