trade, is the link of a familial and native society now being estab-
lished along the primary heroin trafficking route into Europe.
Most of the heroin used in Europe arrives from Afghanistan and
follows one of two primary routes, the Balkan Route through
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey, and into South Eastern
Europe, through Central Europe, and into the West, and the
Northern Route via Central Asia and the Russian Federation.
However, despite some movement of the drugs through the
Northern Route to avoid the war, the United Nations Drug
Report (2017) notes:
Seizure data suggest that the world’s largest opiate-related traf-
ficking activities continue to take place along the Balkan route.
Overall, 37 per cent of the global quantity of heroin and mor-
phine seized were reported by countries heavily affected by the
trafficking of Afghan opiates along the Balkan route in 2015,
or 43 per cent of seizures made in West and Central Europe are
included (most of the quantities seized in that sub-region are
related to trafficking via the Balkan route) (Booklet 3, p 17).
The Balkan Route goes directly through Turkey, passing its
neighboring country of Syria, and even small portions of the Bal-
kan Route pass through Syria. In the past, the extent of the war
likely destabilized heroin trafficking in Syria. However, the Asia
Times reports that the New Silk road will likely go through Syria
(a Shanghai-Latakia route); an initiative based on the pre-ex-
isting “One Belt and One Road Initiative” promoted by China
(Escobar, 2017). Where high trade traffic exists, it is easy to hide
contraband among all the legal products; to inspect every piece
of cargo is impossible, and quite often, very little cargo is inspect-
ed to prevent significant interruptions in the shipping process.
This is bad news, particularly when correlated with reports that
the Islamic State (IS) may have already gained from revenues of
heroin traffic transiting their territory (Watkinson, 2015). Drug
trafficking is not new to IS, who is known for fueling their sol-
diers with amphetamines. Understanding the existing networks
becomes important for several reasons. For one, as the wars end,
there will be lots of young Syrian men looking for employment.
Pre-established trafficking networks already operate in Syria via
the amphetamine trade, and it will take time for other econom-
ic opportunities to return to a war-torn Syria. The trafficking
of Captagon, the amphetamine used by IS (AKA “the jihad-
ists’ drug”), existed in Syria well before the war. The war only
expanded the drug trade, and helped develop a strong, existing
source of income with experienced traffickers (The Global Initia-
tive against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016, p 29).
One study found that drug trafficking entities typically establish
bases of operations and drug trafficking routes through familial
societies of their own ethnic, cultural and language base, be-
cause it is much easier to establish networks and maintain a low
profile (Davids, 2001, p 8). Operating in an area of domestic
familiarization provides both the ability to remain discreet, and
the possibility of staying with family or friends from the old
country. The person providing a temporary home for a traffick-
er, even in a foreign country, might be unaware of the trafficking
situation at hand, or begrudgingly assist because of no or little
employment options. In the case of the Syrian refugees, traffick-
ers would have an exceptionally vulnerable population, some
of whom may be family and friends separated and scattered all
over Europe. Combine this with the already established heroin
routes and abuse in Europe, and the conditions are plausible
for refugees to be integrated into drug trafficking operations,
or to eventually lead their own drug trafficking organizations
(DTOs).
None of this is to say that drug abuse or trafficking among the
Syrian refugees is inevitable, but that it is highly plausible based
on the conditions and environment. The large majority of
Syrians who became refugees presumably had no desire to use
or traffic drugs at any point in their previous lives, and it’s likely
they are not yearning to start now. Furthermore, they have
religious morals which would drive many away from any such
desire. However, the Syrian refugees were pushed from their
homes in the most brutal and violent manner. Refugees from
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua likely had no desire or
intent to come to America and form the brutal MS-13 gangs.
When they started their gangs to protect themselves from
gang violence in the Los Angeles area, these Central American
refugees simply had the war experiences and trauma to make
them more violent and brutal. The changes of life as a refugee
can obviously change a person. While many strive to return to
normal lives, many are simply fighting to survive, and that could
push any person to extremes.
Practically speaking, Syrian refugees could not just jump into
trafficking heroin without the risk of reprisal. There are power-
ful DTOs from Italian, Albanian, Montenegrin, Turkish, Rus-
sian, Ukrainian, Serbian, and other criminal syndicates already
involved in drug trafficking. These organizations are not going
to sit idly by and watch their profits go to a handful of refugees.
However, the current DTOs might find the refugee population
vulnerable from their economic situation and trauma, and thus
leverage their networks for low level trafficking and distri-
bution. Once involved, however, the door is open for Syrian
trafficking to develop and expand operations based on their
pre-established contacts across the Balkan route into Europe.
Such expansion would allow Syrian DTOs to either partner
with the current DTOs, or try to take over territories and drug
routes, resulting in more violence.
31