Peace & Stability Journal Peace & Stability Journal, Volume 6, Issue 4 - Page 20

-Have strategic patience; the reason Plan Colombia worked was the U.S. made small and incremental investments over a long period of time. Success has to be measured in terms of integrated and holistic measures of effectiveness/measures of performance. Leaders must be mindful of the fact that success will not happen overnight. -Help develop a military justice system; the host nation military must be able to investigate and adjudicate offenses committed within their ranks. The PN military members understand that they are accountable to international law, and understand that by following international human rights standards, they will improve their way of life. -Work to facilitate sound logistics practices, policies, and training, otherwise, PN military might feel pressure to steal from their military supply distribution chain to sustain themselves. -Consider changing the moniker “security forces” to “security services providers,” as this might create a better public perception of the PN military as being force for the protection of their own people. -Ensure the generating institutions train the security service providers to follow the PN law (i.e., constitution, tribal law, customary law, traditional law etc.) -Train practitioners and senior policy makers to recognize the early warning signals of instability. USAID and DoS can help DoD recognize these early warning signals and their implications. Preventative measure can be taken earlier and at a much lower cost than total invasion/state take-over. A more formalized interagency communications and network integration is essential for early warning success. Two examples of such signals might be the recruitment of foreign security force from one ethnicity, or an increase in executive powers or protection for the Prime Minister or President. -Establish funding transfer authority for U.S. national authorizations and appropriations to ensure the agency carrying out these SFA-type missions are allocated the appropriate funding associated with them. In some cases, USAID or DoS might be better suited for the SFA fund distribution. -Rebalances national security mission objectives to reflect a more proactive SFA strategy for PNs with fragile security institutions in order to prevent the need for those large-scale interventions, specifically those PNs aligned with our national security interests; not everything is phase three. 18 Conclusion History suggests the U.S. might enhance protection of its vital interests from malign state actors as well as violent extremist organizations by helping partner nations develop their own organic security force generating function. Where that is true, steps can and should be taken to better equip leaders with improved policy, doctrine, training, education, and experience to carry out these SFA-type missions. This document contains some thoughts and recommendation for improving the SFA generating function. For the full report on the Work Group findings see,