Security Force Assistance Background and History
In 2006 , Secretary of Defense , Donald Rumsfeld , chartered an organization called the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance ( JCISFA ) to work with the Joint Staff J7 ( Joint Force Development Directorate ) to integrate Security Force Assistance ( SFA ) lessons and best practices from Iraq and Afghanistan across the Joint Force and the services . In 2012 , Secretary Panetta updated the charter to more broadly look at these issues around the world and incorporate them along the pillars of Joint Force Development : doctrine , training , exercises , education , lessons learned , and concepts . JCISFA ’ s research has led its analysts to the conclusion that , while the U . S . military has experienced success training foreign forces to fight , they have had far less success helping partner nations develop their own capability to build and field forces , i . e ., a generating function . Considering U . S . national security interests within the context of diminishing defense resources and an increasingly complex operational environment makes clear that an organic generating function capability in our foreign security partners is important to gaining and maintaining relative peace and security around the world in the future .
Generating Function and the “ Five Strategic Threats ”
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Generally , there are three functions essential to viable security forces , thereby necessitating assessments and possibly assistance in one or all three functional areas . The first is the “ executive function .” This is where policies , laws , and regulations are created . Next is the “ generating function .” Here , the force recruits , trains , and equips itself . Finally , the “ operating function ” is where the work of the security force is done ; this is the function with which most military members , regardless of rank , are most familiar . Today ’ s operations tempo , resourcing challenges , and increasingly complex operational environment make it critical for the United States to have security partners with enduring capabilities to contribute to global security efforts . Current U . S . Defense Leadership , Secretary of Defense Ash Carter , and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford , indirectly highlighted these requirements when they recently identified the “ Five Strategic Threats ” to U . S . National Security : Iran , China , North Korea , Russia , and Violent Extremist Organizations ( VEOs ). Partner nations with their own generating function could help deter aggression from state threats and disrupt non-state violent extremist organizations . Fighting the Taliban in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan taught the U . S . a number of important lessons , not the least of which was that VEOs often find safe-haven in areas beyond the reach of government rule and the rule of law . In 2007 , RAND produced a monograph appropriately titled “ Ungoverned Territories : Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks .” The monograph describes in great detail why some environments are more attractive to terrorist organizations than others , what some of those more attractive environments might look like , and how to make those environment less fertile for terrorist inhabitants . In short , assuming the terrorist activity is not state sponsored , many of the problems , as suggested by the monograph ’ s title , results from either no government influence and oversight or not enough of it — the terms coined by RAND in this study are “ ungoverned ” and “ undergoverned .” Developing a generating function not only gives the partner nation security forces greater capability ( i . e ., they learn how to perform tasks they could not previously perform ), but it also gives them greater capacity ( i . e ., they have more forces to perform those tasks vital to local and regional security ). This increased capacity could be used to patrol , monitor , and police those parts of a territory that might otherwise be perfect training areas for terrorist , outside of the view of forces who might disrupt their efforts . With more forces and more capable forces , U . S . foreign security partners will be better equipped to root out terrorist organizations in those remote parts of their country that they could not previously reach . Once found and dismantled , the terrorist organizations could be kept out with regular security patrols . Further , more capable foreign security partners who can disrupt VEOs could also help deter aggression from those most violent , most dangerous , and most unstable malign state actors , i . e , North Korea and Iran .
Working Group 4 Findings
Stakeholders from the SFA community of interest and practice in small discussion groups collectively identify approaches to institutional development in foreign security forces . The subgroups focused on the implications that such development might have for the security , justice , and economic sectors of the partner nation ( PN ). WG 4 ’ s objective was to find techniques to encourage PN ownership of development and maintenance of their own generating function . The identified techniques were aligned to DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendations ( DCRs ) ( i . e ., non-materiel solutions ) that might assist the Joint Staff J7 ( Joint Force Development Directorate ) with this problem . The goal was to provide recommendations as to how the U . S . can better equip its forces to build institutional capability and capacity in foreign security partners resulting in the development of their own generating function . If U . S . commanders and military planners are provided with training and planning constructs that drive their efforts toward leaving the PN with an organic generating capability , the U . S . will have a powerful tool for protecting its interest through “ security surrogates .” This approach is not only in the U . S .’ s interests , but also benefits PN citizens with a more peaceful and stable environment in which to live and work . The likely PN candidates would be those with