Notes:
Afghanistan," Occasional Paper No. 7, London: Crisis States
Research Center, December 2008, pp. 13-14.
8
Ibid. Ahmed reports that newly elected President Ashraf
Ghani has “promised to disarm (local) militias,” chiefly because
they collect taxes by force to support themselves.
9
George, R. and D. Paradiso, “The Case for a Wartime Chief
Executive Officer: Fixing the Interagency Quagmire in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, June 21, 2011. (www.foreignaffairs.com/
fa_subcontent/67833/67834)
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
See NATO Media Backgrounder, “Afghan National Security
Forces,” June 2013. (http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/
pdf/pdf_2013_06/20130604_130604-mb-ansf.pdf )
13
See Mojumdar, A., “Afghanistan: Rethinking the Constitutional Balance of Power,” Eurasianet.org, October 1, 2009.
(http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav100209a.shtml). Power in Afghanistan is highly concentrated
in the President's office. Governors of provinces are appointed
by the president. Provincial councils – whose elections are held
concurrently with the presidential vote -- have no powers and
barely any role in the management of local affairs. District
council elections have yet to be held.
14
Following a six-day battle between the ANDSF and Taliban
killing over 100 civilians in the Ghazni district of Ajrestan in
September 2014, Pashtun villagers hanged four Taliban fighters
turned over by the ANDSF. Their action demonstrated a strong
resolve to resist the Taliban and protect their homeland. See
Reuters, “Afghan villagers hang Taliban fighters as battle for
district rages,” September 27, 2014. (http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/09/27/us-afghanistan-attacks-idUSKCN0HM0BH20140927)
See Cordesman, Anthony H., “The Challenges to Afghan
Transition,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 31, 2014. The attrition rate is also analyzed
in the Department of Defense Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2013, p. 48. (http://
www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.
pdf ).
2
This was the case in most of Afghanistan and Iraq except for
the latter’s Sunni triangle and Kurdish region. See Ricks, T.E.,
The Gamble: David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-08, London: Penguin, 2009, pp. 219-20.
Ricks argues that the U.S.-led Coalition began working more
effectively with Iraq’s tribal and ethnic structure in those areas
during 2007, under the leadership of Petraeus and then Marine
Brigadier General John Allen. Other observers argue the Sunni
Awakening was embraced earlier. Notwithstanding chronology,
General Petraeus made similar efforts to draw ethnic forces into
the overall Iraqi defense effort in Mosul in 2004. In all cases,
sustainability of these forces – both financial and political -became a glaring problem over time since they were mainly seen
as potential challenges to the government rather than localized
approaches to be incorporated into the government.
3
Because of funding uncertainty, many critics believe a universal draft is the long-term answer to bringing down the cost of
the ANDSF. Compulsory service was proposed by President
Karzai in early 2010 but most scholars have ruled it out mainly
because of its potential to alienate local populaces in the very
areas where the insurgency is strongest. See Meyerle, J. et al.,
Conscription in the Afghan Army, Center for Naval Analyses,
April 2011. (http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/
cna%20conscription%20in%20the%20afghan%20army%20
2%20--%20crm%20d0024840.a2%20final.pdf )
Prof. Spangler has over
4
R. Nordland and J. Goldstein, “Afghan Taliban’s Reach is
thirty-six years of experiWidest Since 2001, UN Says,” New York Times, October 11.
ence as a former State De2015. http://www.nytimes.com /2015/10/12/world/asia/afpartment officer stationed
ghanistan-taliban-united-nations.html
in Central and East Asia
5
This table is derived from the Center for Naval Analyses, Sumand Eastern Europe.
mary of Independent Assessment of Afghan National Security
Currently a visiting profesForces, January 2014, p. 1. (Website: https://www.cna.org/resor at the Peacekeeping
search/2014/summary-independent-assessment-afghan-nationand Stability Operations
al). The “other” category includes Defense Ministry personnel Institute at the U.S. Army War College. He is focused on
and Afghan Local Police staffing numbers.
peace, prosperity, and security issues in the Asia-Pacific and
6
This article supports Colonel (retired) Mann’s view that comCentral Asia.
munity defense forces are needed to secure rural areas. However, all three camps reviewed in Part One have not devoted much
attention to their sizing.
7
The AAR approach drawing on arbakai appears better suited for this region where tribal defense traditions persist. See
M.O. Tariq, "Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeastern
1
6