fears in the rural areas that the national government does not care about improving AAR accountability . In addition , a separate training event with local ANA and ANP appears necessary to determine the roles and purposes of the AAR in various localities .
Finally , active-duty SOF should oversee the continuation of a literacy education program begun in 2009 within the ANA . Fighting illiteracy offers a key incentive for AAR retention and the strengthening of civil society . 12
Conclusion
Ultimately , the legitimacy of the Afghan national government may determine if the ANDSF stands or falls to the Taliban . Some analysts argue international donors saddled Afghanistan with too centralized of a governmental system in 2001-03 . 13 Structuring the Afghan state under an extremely powerful chief executive appears to have retarded the development of checks-and-balances and facilitated corrupt practices . Moving away from this top-down system has the potential to foster more positive democratic trends including the election of governors and a more responsive justice system .
Unfortunately , it remains a big question whether these democratic reforms can be instituted over the medium term . In the near term , it appears more pragmatic and workable for Afghan leaders to return to the idea of an Army Reserve , one that was considered under the Karzai government , but rejected due to strong ANA bias for an active-duty standing army , as well as U . S . insistence on making a Reserve in our own image rather than basing it along “ arbakai ” or community defense force lines with strong SOF mentorship .
The Taliban have already adopted their own version of the AAR approach outlined here , and continue to forge it into a conventional force . Faced with the Taliban adversary ( and the resilience of the Taliban recruitment system ), Afghan leaders should create an AAR and reach out to tribal elders to help stand it up to protect home lands . If asked , tribal elders will show courage in helping to form an AAR . 14 The alternative to this course appears stark : Afghanistan may again have to resort to its allies to stave off existential challenges to its government . Drawing the red lines triggering the return of international security forces , as in the past , will largely be determined by the national security interests of Afghanistan ’ s allies . On the other hand , an AAR and a more effective , inclusive , and accountable ANDSF depends on the decisions of Afghans alone .
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