several historical lessons in transportation. Shifting transport to
civilian (or foreign military) partners would allow the Air Force
to cease producing C-17s, for example, but if the Air Force
decides to restart C-17 production at a later point, it would
take up to two years and cost $5.7 billion,40 which replicates the
1895–1898 Army experience with supply wagons. Recent experience provides evidence that the civilian air industry is willing
and capable of increasing capacity to meet deployment demands, although the geopolitical and operational environments
have offered only minor impediments to deployments and
supply lines. These circumstance will not always prevail, and the
complicating factor of foreign ownership, or joint ventures with
civilian airlines, or port labor unions, raise additional questions
of reliable access that echo the experiences of Vietnam, Korea,
and World-War II Britain.
Although the citizenry has often responded to calls to support
the nation in a time of crisis, significant issues recur that both
Defense planners and congressional leaders must consider. In
a high-intensity environment, access is not permissive, and
civilians are neither trained, nor armed to defend themselves
adequately. The Merchant Marines persist in seeking veteran status, due to the significant risks and losses they suffered
operating in a hostile environment. Although no U.S. conflicts
in the past 70 years encountered proportionate civilian losses in
strategic lift, recent experience has un derscored substantial risks
to deployed civilians. Military planners have noted that during
the 1991 Gulf War “many CRAF airlines would not fly at night
into bases which were threatened by chemical weapons.”41 This
hesitation echoes the Mexican-War era experience of transporters’ strikes, but the circumstances are more complex. Resolution
would require combat preparation for contractors in the most
extreme situations, in which prior military experience constitutes the primary source of personnel.
Permissive environments allow not only for civilian contracting
capabilities that would be unthinkable in a high-intensity environment, but they also portray an intervention environment
which would require significantly fewer personnel than the
public might otherwise support. The recent Afghan and Iraqi
interventions recruited many civilian personnel in support of
stability operations, but those who were injured encountered
bureaucratic battles to acquire access to military medical treatment, and to receive compensation for those injuries. The public
would consider this lack of access and compensation scandalous
if applied to the military. If Congress fails to provide for the
treatment of contracted civilian casualties in a hostile environment, then we should anticipate campaigns for recognition for
combat service of civilian volunteers.
Civil-military partnerships are no less important to operational
execution than they are to the Clausewitzian triad of strategic
support for war. Facilitating civilian contributions to military
operations requires government and popular support to ensure deployed civilians receive equal benefits and support as
military service members. Strategic planning must recognize
that competition for civilian resources could well change the
assumptions underlying the civilian provision of transport for
future campaigns.
Notes:
Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University
staff interview of former Undersecretary of Defense David S. C.
Chu regarding the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, May 6,
2014.
2
Then-Major William W. Epley, “Civilian Support of Field
Armies,” Army Logistician No. 22, Nov-Dec 1990, pp. 30–35,
here p. 30.
3
Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of
the Corps, 1775–1939, Washington, DC: Center of Military
History, 1989, p. 243.
4
Benjamin King, Richard C. Biggs, and Eric R. Criner, Spearhead of Logistics: A History of the United States Army Transportation Corps, Washington, DC: Center of Military History/Ft.
Eustis, VA: USA Transportation Center, 2001, p. 53.
5
Brigadier General Thomas Cruse, Apache Days and After,
Caldwell, II: Caxton, 1941, p. 264.
6
Risch, p. 667.
7
Robert D. Hormats, The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s
Wars, New York: Holt, 2007, p. 107.
8
King et al., pp. 121–27, 132–35, 495–97.
9
U.S. Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce,
“The United States Merchant Marine: A Brief History,” Washington, DC: MARAD, 1967, n.p. MARAD was transferred in
1981 to the Department of Transportation.
10
See, “Mariners’ Struggle for Veteran Status,” U.S. Merchant
Marine¸ n.d., www.usmm.org/strugglevetstatus.html.
11
CPT James W. Hamilton and 1LT William J. Bolce, Jr., Gateway to Victory: The Wartime Story of the San Francisco Army
Port of Embarkation, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1946,
pp. 1, 3. See also http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?37154
and “The Cynthia Olson,” Art Fiber Glass, n.d., www.artfiberglass.com/ship/co.html.
12
Bruce L. Felknor, The U.S. Merchant Marine at War, 1775–
1945, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998.
13
King et al., p. 142.
14
Hamilton and Bolce, p. 205.
15
Hamilton and Bolce, pp. 5–6.
16
King et al., pp. 216–18, 230–31.
17
Ibid., pp. 244–49.
18
Ibid., p. 304.
19
Epley, p. 35.
20
King et al., pp. 329–33, 337.
21
Epley, p. 31.
22
Joint Planner’s Handbook for Deployment Operations, Scott
1
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