arrived before U.S. Army stevedores. Echoing episodes from
Mexico and World War II, Vietnamese stevedores were supposed to unload the ship, but their union refused to send them,
so an Army lieutenant recruited a group of enlisted men for the
task.20 Military staff predominantly contracted onward movement by truck, but the contractor, Philco Ford, would not operate on some routes, thus requiring the use of military vehicles
and drivers on those routes.21
The Shift to Air Transport
Since the Vietnam era, military personnel deploy primarily
by air. For Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Air
Force used 90 percent of its C-5 Galaxies and 80 percent of its
C-141 Starlifters to move 72 percent of the air cargo, but only
one third of the personnel. The remaining military personnel
deployed via civilian aircraft through a combination of contract flights and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). CRAF
is a partnership with U.S.-flagged civilian airlines that provide
designated aircraft and volunteer crews. In exchange for U.S.
Government use of U.S.-flagged carriers for peacetime transportation, these carriers pledge availability of aircraft capable of
various range categories. The “carriers continue to operate and
maintain the aircraft […]; however, [Air Mobility Command]
controls the aircraft missions.”22
In preparation for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Air Mobility Command reviewed the use of CRAF for its air traffic flow
during both DESERT STORM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Of three stages of activation, each calling for successively
more aircraft, it has not been necessary to go beyond Stage II,23
and airlines find it less disruptive to provide aircraft voluntarily. Carriers provide four crews per aircraft, all U.S. citizens,
and participants include major airlines, e.g., American, Delta,
and United, regional airlines, and charter carriers. Reliance on
civilian carriers has continued to rise. In a 2012 report, U.S.
Transportation Command noted 28 CRAF carriers provided
93 percent of DoD’s passenger movement (as well as 37 percent
of bulk-cargo capability), and served all five major airports in
Afghanistan.
Joint Civil-Military Transportation Management
In 1978, Exercise NIFTY NUGGET uncovered differing
expectations by civilian transportation providers and military
planners, while examining responsiveness to a potential invasion
of Western Europe. The result was to project a Joint Deployment Agency, but it took passage of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act to enable the Reagan administration to establish the U.S.
Transportation Command, with three service components:
Military Airlift Command, reorganized in 1992 as Air Mobility
Command; Military Sealift Command; and Military Traffic
Management Command, redesignated in 2004 as Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command.24
Although C-5s and C-17s were built specifically to accommodate heavy military cargo, the cost of air transport dictates a
preference for sealift. Military Sealift Command uses a combination of government-owned and commercial ships with civilian crews, though there may be naval personnel aboard for specific functions. Though the crews are civilian, Navy Reservists
often serve in port operations and at command posts, and the
mix spurs calls for more reserve billets. Efforts to affiliate merchant mariners with Naval Reserve units have been problematic.
Although the desirability of having licensed merchant-marine
officers hold reserve commissions dates back to the Merchant
Marine Act, the requirements for Naval Reserve service often
preclude seafarers from service in Reserve units.25
A permutation of the continual call for Navy reserve billets
appeared from 2005 to 2007 as part of a projected National
Security Personnel System. The Navy had civilian mariners on
its noncombatant, “black-hulled” ships, and if the ship needed
to go in harm’s way, the Navy anticipated replacing the civilians
with uniformed personnel. The Office of the Secretary of the
Navy proposed making such positions subject to dual status,
akin to the “technicians” in the Army Guard and Reserve:
civilians in peacetime who would deploy in military status. In
this capacity, the civilian on the non-combatant ships would be
an individual Navy Reservist. Alternatively, the civilian position
could be subject to deployment as a civilian, responsive to the
chain of command, but the concept ran afoul of two interest
groups. The Congressional staff did not want to cut the number
of uniformed personnel in the Navy, and some interests in the
Civil Service opposed initiatives to reclassify civilian personnel.26
Strategic Lift and the Civil-Military Mix
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review announced a goal of
“rebalancing tooth to tail” with a priority of spending on combat power.27 Such a refocus is the current version of the Army’s
1895 divestiture of supply wagons, and is entirely predictable
as an effort to preserve core capabilities. Logistics has been the
most worrisome component of contingency planning. Since
the 1940s, multi-theater war has been as much a circumstance
as a theoretical challenge for the United States. Its incarnation
in military strategy as two (nearly) simultaneous major contingencies has undergone modifications. Since the US military
has never had the capacity to fully support offensive action in
multiple theaters. The Pacific theater in WW II did not receive
significant resources until the war in Europe was well on the way
to a favorable resolution, and the China-Burma-India theater
was never a priority. Prosecution of the Korean War always
had to recognize the higher national priority was an attack in
Europe which would draw many resources out of Korea. Critics
of the 2003 Iraq intervention argued over its diversion of assets
and supplies from the conflict in Afghanistan, which likely led
to a more protracted engagement in Afghanistan. Between the
33