Peace & Stability Journal Peace & Stability Journal, Volume 6, Issue 3 | Page 35

arrived before U.S. Army stevedores. Echoing episodes from Mexico and World War II, Vietnamese stevedores were supposed to unload the ship, but their union refused to send them, so an Army lieutenant recruited a group of enlisted men for the task.20 Military staff predominantly contracted onward movement by truck, but the contractor, Philco Ford, would not operate on some routes, thus requiring the use of military vehicles and drivers on those routes.21 The Shift to Air Transport Since the Vietnam era, military personnel deploy primarily by air. For Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Air Force used 90 percent of its C-5 Galaxies and 80 percent of its C-141 Starlifters to move 72 percent of the air cargo, but only one third of the personnel. The remaining military personnel deployed via civilian aircraft through a combination of contract flights and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). CRAF is a partnership with U.S.-flagged civilian airlines that provide designated aircraft and volunteer crews. In exchange for U.S. Government use of U.S.-flagged carriers for peacetime transportation, these carriers pledge availability of aircraft capable of various range categories. The “carriers continue to operate and maintain the aircraft […]; however, [Air Mobility Command] controls the aircraft missions.”22 In preparation for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Air Mobility Command reviewed the use of CRAF for its air traffic flow during both DESERT STORM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Of three stages of activation, each calling for successively more aircraft, it has not been necessary to go beyond Stage II,23 and airlines find it less disruptive to provide aircraft voluntarily. Carriers provide four crews per aircraft, all U.S. citizens, and participants include major airlines, e.g., American, Delta, and United, regional airlines, and charter carriers. Reliance on civilian carriers has continued to rise. In a 2012 report, U.S. Transportation Command noted 28 CRAF carriers provided 93 percent of DoD’s passenger movement (as well as 37 percent of bulk-cargo capability), and served all five major airports in Afghanistan. Joint Civil-Military Transportation Management In 1978, Exercise NIFTY NUGGET uncovered differing expectations by civilian transportation providers and military planners, while examining responsiveness to a potential invasion of Western Europe. The result was to project a Joint Deployment Agency, but it took passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to enable the Reagan administration to establish the U.S. Transportation Command, with three service components: Military Airlift Command, reorganized in 1992 as Air Mobility Command; Military Sealift Command; and Military Traffic Management Command, redesignated in 2004 as Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command.24 Although C-5s and C-17s were built specifically to accommodate heavy military cargo, the cost of air transport dictates a preference for sealift. Military Sealift Command uses a combination of government-owned and commercial ships with civilian crews, though there may be naval personnel aboard for specific functions. Though the crews are civilian, Navy Reservists often serve in port operations and at command posts, and the mix spurs calls for more reserve billets. Efforts to affiliate merchant mariners with Naval Reserve units have been problematic. Although the desirability of having licensed merchant-marine officers hold reserve commissions dates back to the Merchant Marine Act, the requirements for Naval Reserve service often preclude seafarers from service in Reserve units.25 A permutation of the continual call for Navy reserve billets appeared from 2005 to 2007 as part of a projected National Security Personnel System. The Navy had civilian mariners on its noncombatant, “black-hulled” ships, and if the ship needed to go in harm’s way, the Navy anticipated replacing the civilians with uniformed personnel. The Office of the Secretary of the Navy proposed making such positions subject to dual status, akin to the “technicians” in the Army Guard and Reserve: civilians in peacetime who would deploy in military status. In this capacity, the civilian on the non-combatant ships would be an individual Navy Reservist. Alternatively, the civilian position could be subject to deployment as a civilian, responsive to the chain of command, but the concept ran afoul of two interest groups. The Congressional staff did not want to cut the number of uniformed personnel in the Navy, and some interests in the Civil Service opposed initiatives to reclassify civilian personnel.26 Strategic Lift and the Civil-Military Mix The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review announced a goal of “rebalancing tooth to tail” with a priority of spending on combat power.27 Such a refocus is the current version of the Army’s 1895 divestiture of supply wagons, and is entirely predictable as an effort to preserve core capabilities. Logistics has been the most worrisome component of contingency planning. Since the 1940s, multi-theater war has been as much a circumstance as a theoretical challenge for the United States. Its incarnation in military strategy as two (nearly) simultaneous major contingencies has undergone modifications. Since the US military has never had the capacity to fully support offensive action in multiple theaters. The Pacific theater in WW II did not receive significant resources until the war in Europe was well on the way to a favorable resolution, and the China-Burma-India theater was never a priority. Prosecution of the Korean War always had to recognize the higher national priority was an attack in Europe which would draw many resources out of Korea. Critics of the 2003 Iraq intervention argued over its diversion of assets and supplies from the conflict in Afghanistan, which likely led to a more protracted engagement in Afghanistan. Between the 33