Peace & Stability Journal Peace & Stability Journal, Volume 6, Issue 3 | Page 23

opment and capacity building, decided to become part of the leadership team of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and Iraq. All UAPs maintain a training mechanism for their personnel; some are more institutional than practical in delivery. As more of an exception than a standard, DoS and USAID in coordination with DoD security elements and Civil Affairs teams conducted a month long training session with a capstone field exercise to enhance integrated PRT command team planning prior to deployment. A secondary, but equally important aspect of this field exercise, was to allow the PRT command team to gain a better understanding of each other capabilities, and to begin to build those relationships necessary to operate as an effective team. With certain exceptions, these training and educational efforts are physically and fiscally stove piped by agency. Therein lies the issue in achieving a “whole of government” approach to National Security. While we have by agency, educational institutions, and think tank developed a robust and often bewildering national security apparatus that functions somewhat well in the national capital region, our interagency approach to overseas operations is distinctly 17th Century when an Ambassador operated largely on his own. The only time we bring the country team and DoD elements together is when the USG initiate actual military operations. In short, our whole of government learning has been, and still is experience-based. Expeditionary Operations The implementation of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) at the JRTC shows great promise in filling the “the blocking and tackling” training gap between the military and our UAPs. As a CTC, the JRTC was established as a training center for joint light and special operations forces; prior to 9-11 that light and Special Operations Forces (SOF) training effort tended to remain very separate. Operations since then have made such separation impossible. The JRTC has matured in the past 15 years of war, meeting the challenges of training units for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while posturing to meet future challenges. The DATE captures those changes and challenges conventional and special operations forces coordinate efforts when operating in a triad with UAPs to support training for global reaction and regional alignment. Given an uncertain strategic environment and fiscal conservancy, U.S. military forces have turned increasingly toward greater capabilities instead of numbers. The dominant issue pushing that transformation has been, and will most likely continue to be, the rapid emergence of security challenges across the globe; challenges that dictate an increased capacity for expeditionary operations. U.S. Army doctrine recognizes the need for an expeditionary mindset and capabilities across the force to produce campaign quality forces trained and ready to deploy for 21