Imagine a place where Unified Action Partners ( UAPs ) could actually work though the frictions of a whole of government approach in a live , free play exercise , akin to the Mayor ’ s Office scene in the movie Ghostbusters , where : service partners were working together ; Special operations forces coordinating efforts with conventional forces ; Interagency partners guiding operations under a chief of mission ’ s authority ; Nongovernmental organizations ( NGOs ) talking to host nation security ; all are challenged by an enemy nicknamed Geronimo with an “ evil ” arsenal . Imagine further that when the dust settles , the participants have the opportunity to examine their experiences in depth . Although Ghostbusters was a movie , the training just described above is real ; and can be found at the Joint Readiness Training Center ( JRTC ). Geronimo makes the Stay-Puft Marshmallow Man look like a softy . 3
Combined Arms and Whole of Government
Whole of government , like combined arms warfare , is not a new concept . The U . S . government ( USG ) has long sought to improve its approach to national security and set interagency coordination and cooperation as a goal . The U . S . military has similarly set combined arms warfare as its ideal . Both concepts hinge on the idea that all means of influence or power taken in total are more than the simple sum of the parts . The Louisiana Maneuvers of 1940 were meant to drive that concept home as the U . S . Army prepared itself for entrance into World War II . General George Marshall , as the Army Chief of Staff , worked with Major General Leslie McNair , to develop a training model that used large maneuvers and live fire to create what they felt was realistic training .
Despite that effort , the U . S . Army would find itself learning from experience on battlefields across the globe . Indeed military historians would note that the U . S . military had a well-deserved reputation for losing its first battles as it had since the Revolutionary War . In 1973 , General William DePuy established Training and Doctrine Command to institute unit and Soldier standards in order to achieve Marshall and McNair ’ s vision . In the late 1970s , the Army established the National Training Center as the capstone to General Marshall ’ s concept from 1939 . The stunning success of U . S . Army forces in Desert Shield and Storm documented the value of the Combat Training Centers ( CTCs ) as the Army expanded the CTC program to include JRTC , the Joint Multinational Readiness Center ( JMRC ), and the Mission Command Training Program ( MCTP ). The U . S . Army has not been alone in its effort to expand unit collective training . The United States Marine Corps runs a collective training center at 29 Palms California . The U . S . Air Force Green Flag units run collective Joint training exercises that are fused with the U . S . Army and Marine training efforts .
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All of these training centers made the “ blocking and tackling ” of collective combat real ; resulting in America ’ s military ending its propensity of losing first battles in favor of decisive victory .
Unified Training for Unified Action Partners
But what of the long term goal to apply a whole of government approach to operations ? A cursory look of short notice , long distance operations as well as long term campaigns suggests that the goal — as stated in the National Security Strategy of 2010 — remains but a goal . Whether operations in Lebanon in 1958 , the Dominican Republic in the 1960s , the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1960s , 1970s , or 1990s , whole of government or interdependence was achieved through experience . That same experience-based learning model was applied in sustained campaigns in Southeast Asia , and of late in Iraq and Afghanistan . We win the battles , but still muddle through the post-combat transition . We achieve less than optimal results because we have not effectively trained to determine what optimal should look like .
Note also that the National Security Structure of the United States has , without pause , been focused on the interagency in the national capitol with a unique military command structure developed under the Unified Command Plan to establish regional and specialized commands with the goal of addressing global responsibilities . In contrast to the military approach , the U . S . Department of State ( DoS ), the U . S . Agency for International Development ( USAID ), and other agencies , have relied on the interagency mission structure at embassies and consulates under the supervision of the Ambassador , as the Presidential Appointed Chief of Mission .
There is no interagency equivalent for U . S . Central Command or U . S . Africa Command . The various UAPs do maintain capabilities to reinforce their presence abroad based on mission and demand . USAID established the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation ( CMC ) to align development and defense and leverage the unique capabilities of both partners to achieve better development outcomes in pursuit of U . S . national security goals . This mission is accomplished through a personnel exchange of Foreign Service Officer , civil servants and contractors to combatant commands , while military officers work in USAID offices . USAID ’ s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance ( OFDA ) specializes in disaster and humanitarian relief using Disaster Assistance Response Teams ( DARTs ), which coordinate and manage optimal USG responses , while working closely with local officials , the international community , and relief agencies . USAID also maintains a network of regional offices in key areas . DoS , in an effort to mirror the outreach capabilities of the DoD , while coordinating the USG message of devel-