Peace & Stability Journal Peace & Stability Journal, Volume 6, Issue 1 | Page 22

troops and equipment remains in Mali to support MINUSMA’s operation, as it is beyond their capability to autonomously conduct anti-terrorism operations. Augmentation by French troops in peace support operation against terrorist groups is crucial for the implementation of MINUSMA’s multidimensional mandates. strategic airlift for peacekeepers from African TCCs moving into Darfur. The air assets transported almost 5,000 troops in 2005.34 The United Kingdom supported the deployment of the Africa-led international Support Mission to CAR (MISCA) by providing €2 million to the AU to cover immediate MISCA shortfalls, including food, fuel and water in 2013.35 In such scenarios, the restoration of peace requires the use of force, thus increasing the risk that UN forces will become a warring party instead of a peacekeeping force. While the use of force is necessary to accomplish the mandates, particularly protection of civilian, another entity other than the UN must assume the ‘use of force’ role to discourage the perception of the UN being seen as a warring party. In Mali, AFISMA and French troops assumed the use of force role. AMISOM’s use of force in Somalia, clearly indicates its role as a warring party.32 The UN Mission in Somalia supports AMISOM with logistics and funding. AMISOM’s commitment to anti-terrorism operation is significant, and would be difficult for the UN to replace AMISOM with UNPKO forces. Since there is no cease-fire agreement in Somalia, the belligerent parties continue to commit atrocities, necessitating a robust, offensive force to contain extremist’s activities. UNPKO chapter VII authorities include a mandate for protection of civilian, however, protection of civilian is not synonymous with offensive operations. The extent of the mandate for the use of force encompasses the need to create geographical areas that are free from armed attack, secure freedom of movement and access for humanitarian agencies, and protects camps and safe heavens. These activities do not embrace direct offensive operation against terrorists. The current operational environment is unlikely to be conducive for a political process. This complex political situation does not encourage the establishment of a UNPKO to assume the AMISOM mission, particularly with respect to counter-terrorism enforcement operations. NATO has been supporting AMISOM with strategic airlift and sealift support since 2007.36 The U.S. provided equipment, training and logistical support directly to troop contributing countries participating in the AMISOM mission.37 The EU supports the running cost of the AMISOM mission. The EU also provided logistic support and funded €50 million to Mali through the African Peace Facility (APF) for AFISMA.38 The combination of F ɕ