SPORTS
20 Obiter Dicta
The glory past of the Toronto Blue Jays
A look into the Team’s ascension to greatness and its heydays
pa r t four: pu t t ing t he finishing touch on t he m a s t erpiece
kenneth cheak kwan lam › staff writer
T
he signing of Morris and Winfield after the
1991 season was of ample significance. For the
longest time, it was inconceivable to envision
that elite unrestricted free agents would be
willing to sign in Toronto. One reason is because in
the eyes of these top-end unrestricted free agents,
Toronto is a cold city located in a foreign country with
ridiculously high tax rate (at least that was the perception anyway). Another factor was that playing in
SkyDome for half of the season (eighty-one regular
season home games) meant that there was a higher
risk of sustaining hamstring injuries because the field
was (and still is today) covered with artificial turf
and not natural grass. Also, it was very difficult for
the franchise, generally regarded as a small-market
club with a modest payroll, to compete with largemarket U.S.-based teams like the New York Yankees,
the Boston Red Sox, and the Los Angeles Dodgers
for elite unrestricted free agents because the latter
American-based franchises have such deep pockets
that they could offer longer-term contracts and/or
higher annual salary which the Blue Jays could not
match and/or counter.
With all these hurdles, why did Toronto become
the landing site for premium unrestricted free agents
such as Morris and Winfield? Simply put, players want
to play for a winner (especially those who have had
a distinguished playing career but have not hoisted
the World Series trophy), and even though the Blue
Jays had not yet been to the World Series, the club
was seen as a very competitive one that was due for
at least a World Series appearance (as was evidenced
by the team’s ability to win the American League East
Division Title in 1985 and 1989, as well as finishing no
more than two games behind the division winner on
three occasions: 1987, 1988, and 1990).
A secondary factor is that the owner of the team at
the time, Labatt Brewing Company, also sensed that
Toronto was genuinely very close to the World Series
and decided to become a big spender before the 1992
season (putting winning ahead of everything else,
including profit). This means that Gillick now had
just as much (if
not more) financial resources to
not only compete with the big
boys but outbid
them for one or
more premium
unrestricted free
agents on the open market. The stage was now set for
Toronto’s memorable runs in 1992 and 1993.
Major free agent signings such as Morris and
Winfield were not the only tricks up Gillick’s sleeves.
Another trademark of the future Hall-of-Famer GM
which became evident during this period and ironically contradicted his earlier nickname, “Stand Pat,”
was his ability to make impactful mid-season trades
to bolster his already powerful teams. In 1992, Gillick
got former twenty-game-winner David Cone (who
served as Toronto’s second starter throughout the
postseason) from the New York Mets for infielder Jeff
Kent and a player to be named later (Ryan Thompson)
ê Toronto Blue Jays Second baseman Roberto Alomar homers off Dennis Eckersley in Game 4 of the 1992 American
League Championship Series. Photo credit: CBC.ca
on 27 August 1992. Even though he eventually turned
out to be an all-star second baseman in his own right
with the San Francisco Giants years later, this deal
gave the already potent starting rotation additional
ammo and was extremely crucial.
Indeed, I attribute this move as one of the major
reasons why the 96-66 Blue Jays were finally able to
advance past the American League Championship
Series and win the first of their back-to-back World
Series titles. This is because in the playoffs, most
teams would shorten their starting rotation to a
three-man rotation (unlike the
regular season
which is usually
a five-man rotation) with the
reasoning being
that they want to
go with their best
starters. Typically, this means that even if a team were
to get swept by the other one in four straight games,
each team would still be able to use their ace twice. If
the series were to go the full seven games, then both
teams would be able to use their ace three times, and
their second and third starters twice. For the most
part, the teams’ fourth and fifth starters during the
regular season would work out of the bullpen in longrelieve situations when and if needed.
Following this pattern, Toronto used a three-man
rotation of Morris, Cone, and Juan Guzman in the
American League Championship Series against (ALCS)
the Oakland Athletics, which the Blue won in six
“. . . the club was seen as a
very competitive one that was
due for at least a World Series
appearance . . .”
games. However, Toronto actually had so much depth
with its postseason starting rotation that manager
Cito Gaston opted to use Key as the starting pitcher for
game four in the 1992 World Series against the Atlanta
Braves with the three-man rotation of Morris, Cone,
and Juan Guzman pitching games one to three, and
five to seven. As the old saying goes, you can never
have too much pitching!
Of course, Toronto might not have been able to
beat Oakland and reach the World Series if it were not
for Alomar’s heroics against the Athletics’ excellent
closer, Dennis Eckersley, in game four of the ALCS
when Alomar hit a two-run homer off Eckersley in
the ninth inning to tie the game at six, which the Blue
Jays eventually won seven to six in eleven innings.
Alomar’s home run could not have been timelier as
the win gave Toronto a commanding three-to-one
lead over Oakland, a deficit that was too big for the
Athletics to overcome. Even Gillick himself acknowledged the historical importance of Alomar’s home
run: “I don’t think we’d have eve r gone to the World
Series in 92 if he didn’t hit that home run.” So while it
may be true that “good pitching will always stop good
hitting,” it works both ways.
It took sixteen years, but Gillick had finally accomplished what he had set out to do in 1978: bring a
World Series title to Toronto. However, his spending spree did not end with the signings of Morris and
Winfield and the acquisition of Cone. To find out why,
stay tuned for Part 5 of my article. u