O Golpe – Brics, Dólar e Petróleo Euclides_Mance_O_Golpe_Brics_Dolar_e_Petroleo | Page 380

NOTAS E CITAÇÕES NOS IDIOMAS ORIGINAIS that reason, Wade believes the CDS project has received less than serious attention from some people. Both men noted that other companies have acquired neighboring oil and gas concessions after CDS, in hopes of capitalizing on any discovery. 128 The discovery of significant hydrocarbon reserves in Paraguay (if true) the investment that would follow, and the resulting increase in government revenues, would have profound economic and political implications. While CDS’s capital pri- marily comes form the U.K., they already employ a U.S. subcontractor and would likely rely heavily on U.S. suppliers for any significant production. Post remains in close contact with CDS and will report on further developments as the company turns from exploration to production. Wade is keen to keep the USG informed, and to show the GOP the Embassy’s interest in his company. 129 On 4/19, Paraguay hosted a mini-summit with the Presidents of Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela at which it signed two integration accords promoting great- er energy cooperation, including establishment of a binational gas pipeline between Bolivia and Paraguay [...]. The President of Paraguay’s state-owned petroleum com- pany PETROPAR signed a letter of intent with his Venezuelan counterpart to form a company to refit a Paraguayan refinery to receive Venezuelan diesel fuel. Most press focused on the substance of the accords and its potential impact on Mercosur with lesser attention on Chavez’s ostensible efforts to steal the show with lengthy remarks to the press and a Bolivarian event with Cuban FM Perez Roque at Paraguay’s largest university. In a 4/20 meeting with the Ambassador, FM Rachid confided that Para- guay shared our concern about Chavez’ continued meddling in the region [...]. 130 Paraguay’s state-owned oil company PETROPAR racked up short-term debts of 317 million USD with Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA for die- sel supplied since 2007 and about 270 million USD of that is past due. PETROPAR’s total debt more than doubled since 2006 because Paraguay maintained subsidies just as diesel prices peaked in 2007. PETROPAR’s President Pedro Sugastti traveled in April to Venezuela to propose refinancing Paraguay’s debt. Paraguay tried to pay part of its debt with in-kind payments in a food-for-oil scheme, but Paraguayan pri- vate agriculture producers refused to participate, resisting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ overtures. The possibility of PDVSA making a push into Paraguay seems unlikely, as PETROPAR is a weak financial partner for PDVSA, and the market is saturated with private retailers. The immediate issue for Lugo is what to do with PETROPAR’s debt. The only real option is limited to long-term refinancing by PDV- SA or anyone else willing to take risk. 131 Texas based company PetroVictory/Crescent Global Oil (Crescent) is en- gaged in an escalating legal and public relations battle with the government of Para- guay after efforts to find a solution outside the courts failed, in spite of Embassy ad- vocacy for the U.S. company. [...]. Crescent is pursuing an aggressive multi-pronged strategy with legal, public relations, and lobbying fronts to press its case against the Paraguayan government in Paraguay and the United States. Crescent’s case has the potential to negatively impact future U.S. investment and our commercial bilateral relations. 132 Crescent hired the Washington-based law firm [...] and the case’s attorneys [,,,] are both seasoned lobbyists in the U.S. Congress. Locally, Crescent hired [...] one of Paraguay’s most influential attorneys, to lead its legal team. 379 de 382