19 http://nigeriavillagesquare.com/seyiolu-awofeso/23rds-of-19-states-awolowov-shagari.html In response to what they perceived as the Obasanjo “menace”, the Caliphate emirs met on March 28, 2005 in Kaduna under the auspices of the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (nscia), of which the Sultan of Sokoto is the traditional Chairman. At that meeting Major Mustapha Jokolo (rtd), the then Emir of Gwandu, traditionally the second-in-command to the Sultan, complained bitterly that northern Muslims had been marginalized by President Obasanjo: complaining that today they have no banks, and construction companies; that their soldiers were compulsorily retired from the army shortly after Obasanjo came to power; and that their children are being denied recruitment in the army. “We must decide what to do now…Let our people withdraw from the confab… Muslims are not afraid and they will come out to say the truth.” — (“Emir’s Jihad Threat”, Insider Weekly, May 2, 2005, p.17.) BLACK RENAISSANCE NOIRE As it saw its hold on the Nigerian military being systematically destroyed by a vengeful obj, it had to find some alternative weapons for returning to power. obj was on a personal vendetta because his Caliphate masters had humiliated him by imprisoning him for allegedly being party to a coup against their man Gen. Sani Abacha, and for torturing him in prison. A Caliphate that had survived the challenges of rotation, the Orkar coup and June 12, suddenly found itself deprived of its control of the military instrument it had used to hold on to power for three decades. It was not amused. It responded to its eroding hegemony by playing the Sharia card. So, soon after it saw the way obj was going, it launched the sharia movement and installed the sharia as the constitution in the 12 states of its Arewa bastion in Nigeria’s Far North. This was a challenge to the Constitution and tantamount to opting out of the secular Federal Republic of Nigeria. But obj, for reasons best known to himself, declined to enforce the constitution against them. Why did obj do nothing when the Arewa states violated the secular constitution by adopting Sharia? Wasn’t that a form of secession, by repudiating the Constitution that is supposed to hold Nigeria together? Wasn’t that treason? And wasn’t it his duty as President to uphold and enforce the constitution? How was that action constitutionally different from Biafra’s exit from Nigeria? And wasn’t it his duty to preserve “One Nigeria” in the Sharia case — like he had helped do in the Biafra case? Had obj taken action in 2000 against the Sharia “secession”, would Boko Haram have emerged in 2002? Would it have grown into the monster it has become today? 183 Their chronic unclarity about their Caliphate enemy, and their persistent lack of unity would also be true in the struggles since the June 12 crisis. June 12 officially ended in 1999, when a harassed Caliphate made a negotiated handover of power, through a pre-determined election, to obj, its Yoruba agent of proven loyalty. It considered the handover “temporary”. But it soon came to regret the handover. To safeguard his presidency, OBJ retired all “political” military officers who could endanger the nascent democracy. Most of those affected were Hausa-Fulani scions of the Caliphate. OBJ thereby robbed the Caliphate of its military capacity to undermine his government. This earned him their enmity.