New Water Policy and Practice Volume 1, Number 2 - Spring 2015 | Page 53

New Water Policy and Practice reservoir storage among the provinces was ordered (ibid). No substantive decision was taken on the Fazl-e-Akbar committee recommendations and water continued to be distributed on ad hoc orders by the government of Pakistan. In 1977, the government of Pakistan established another commission comprising the chief justices of the High Courts of the Province, headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan to examine the issue of water apportionment (ibid). Then, there was Justice Halim Commission set up to look into the matter (Feyyaz 2011). All these commissions and committees failed to find a permanent solution to address the water disputes between Punjab and Sindh. After series of discussions and debates, in 1991 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif led government forced the signing of the Indus Water Accord to resolve all Indus water-sharing-related disputes. This accord was signed on March 16, 1991 at Karachi, in a meeting of the chief ministers of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then North West Frontier Province). It was ratified by the Council of Common Interests (CCIs) on March 21, 1991 (PILDAT 2011). Under this accord, the IRSA, with headquarters at Lahore, was established to monitor the distribution pattern among the provinces. According to the accord, the three online reservoirs at Tarbela, Mangla, and Chashma and inter-river link canals are the key structural facilities for Indus Basin water management. The allocation of reservoir water shared by provinces was centralized, using “suggested operation criteria” established on a 10-day basis (Qutub and Parajuli 2004). According to the formula to distribute water from IRS, total water available in the system was estimated to be 114.35 MAF below rim stations. It was allocated as 55.95 MAF for Punjab, 48.76 MAF for Sindh, 5.78 MAF for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 3.87 MAF for Balochistan (Water Apportionment Act 1991). The accord provided for the distribution of any surpluses and the shortages as well. The agreement left water discharge to the sea unresolved subject to a study; however, it allocated 10 MAF in the interim for discharge to the sea (ibid). Soon after the apportionment an accord was signed, however it marred into controversy in 1994 when Sindh alleged that Punjab was not releasing its agreed quantity of water. Sindh was also blamed for not releasing water to Balochistan (Mansur 2002). It was alleged that Punjab continues to violate even this one-sided agreement with open connivance of Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), IRSA, and the federal and Punjab governments. Sindh’s share of water is being diverted to Punjab unabashed under one pretext or another (ibid). After the 1994 incident, the Ministry of Water and Power and WAPDA reverted to allocations on the basis of historical use, rather than accord. IRSA was dissolved in 1998, after the then Prime Minister announced controversial plans to build the Kalabagh Dam on the Indus River over the objections of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh. The IRSA was revived in 1999, but as an agency attached to the Federal Ministry of Water and Power, with headquarters in Islamabad. In effect, it has been reduced from an autonomous inter-provincial bargaining arena to an executive agency for short-term operational decision making (Qutub and Parajuli 2004). During the droughts of 2001 and 2002, IRSA failed to generate consensus over water allocation. Demonstrations in Sindh induced the President/Chief Executive (CE) to override its decisions. Technically, the resolution of such conflicts is a matter 52