Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 - Page 13

INSIGHT Conclusion Although mission command is commander centric and commander driven, on examination it is easy to see that NCOs at every level have a primary role in the success of mission command. The mission command philosophy, with its six principles, and the mission command warfighting function, with its tasks and systems, require significant NCO engagement. In fact, the only way commanders will be able to exercise mission command successfully is by having trained, educated, and experienced NCOs at the forefront of operations. Notes 1. Doctrine 2015 refers to a major reorganization of doctrinal publications, begun in 2011 and expected to be complete in 2015. The purpose is to reduce their length and number, reduce development time, and enhance collaboration and accessibility through technology. 2. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2012); Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command (Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 2012). 3. ADP 6-0, 1. 4. Ibid., 2. 5. ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, (Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 2012), 3-2. 6. ADP 6-0, 11. 7. ADRP 6-2, 3-9. 8. Commander’s intent is defined as “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.” Source: Joint Publication ( JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 11 August 2011). 9. ADRP 6-0, 3-2. MR We Recommend Liberty Roads Nicholas Aubin, Histoire & Collections Casemate, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2014, 220 pages, $55.00 T he Red Ball Express Highway is the nickname given to the supply route opened in August 1944 that stretched from the landing beaches to the American armies launched in an incredible pursuit throughout France. For three months, up to 6,000 trucks drove along this route. It symbolizes the opulence and power of American logistics. However, the generals complain in their memoirs about the lack of gasoline, ammunition, and even warm clothing and cigarettes. Patton thought that the rear echelon services led by General Lee had failed in their mission and delayed the end of the war. It is this paradox that led to the writing of this book. The investigation is more than just a detailed account of the campaign as seen from the rear; it is the first publication to cover in depth the American logistical effort during the Second World War in Europe. —From the Publisher MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2014 11