Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 82

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Notes
1. Antoine d’Evry, L’opération Serval à l’épreuve du doute, Focus Stratégique 59 ( July 2015): 1.
Editor’s note: for more on Operation Serval, see Olivier Tramond and Philippe Seigneur, “Operation
Serval: Another Beau Geste in Sub-Saharan Africa?” Military Review 94, no. 6 (November-December
2014): 76–86.
2. Military effectiveness is classically defined as “the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from
the resources physically and politically available.” Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military
Effectiveness, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.
3. In Operation Sangaris, three French soldiers have been killed in action, one accidentally, and 120
were wounded in action.
4. MINUSCA stands for Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation
en Centrafrique, or United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic.
5. MISCA stands for Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine, or
Africa-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic. See the MISCA website for
more information, accessed 21 September 2016, http://misca.peaceau.org/en/page/110-about-misca.
6. Sangaris is not considered officially as a stabilization operation but as a bridging operation. However, the missions accomplished by the units were clearly stabilization focused.
7. James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters 23 (Winter 19951996): 59–69; Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations,” Rand
Review 27 (Summer 2003): 28–29; John J. McGrath, Boots on the Ground, Troop Density in Contingency
Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).
8. Sangaris updates are posted at the French joint headquarters (Etat-major des armées [EMA])
website, accessed 21 September 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/actualites.
9. French Ministry of Defense, French White Paper on Defence and National Security: 2013 (France:
Ministry of Defense, 2013), accessed 23 August 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail-defense/
mediatheque/publications/livre-blanc-2013.
10. “RETEX Sangaris,” Sapeur la Revue du Génie, no. 16, June 2015, 19. Editor’s note: RETEX is short
for retour d’expérience, which refers to analyzing experiences to develop feedback that will lead to
improvement or after-action analysis.
11. Joseph Gallieni, “Rapport sur la conquête de Madagascar,” in Anthologie Mondiale de la Stratégie (Paris: Robert Laffont Collection Bouquins, 1990) 1016–25.
12. For more about the insurgent groups in the Central African Republic, see Yannick Weyns
et al., “Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic,” International Peace Information
Service report, November 2014, accessed 21 September 2016, http://ipisresearch.be/publication/
mapping-conflict-motives-central-african-republic-2/.
13. Lt. Col. Philippe, “RETEX du GTIA 5e RIAOM/Scorpion sur l’opération Sangaris,” Lettre du RETEX-Témoignages no. 26, CDEF [Centre du Doctrine et d’Enseignement du Commandement], December
2015.
14. “RETEX opérations Sangaris,” Fantassins 32 (Summer 2014): 93–105.
15. John J. McGrath, The Other End of the Spear: the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military
Operations, Long War Series Occasional Papers 23 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute
Press, 2007).
16. “RETEX opérations Sangaris,” 93–105.
17. Philippe, “RETEX du GTIA 5e RIAOM/Scorpion sur l’opération Sangaris.”
18. Gen. Bellot des Minières, Journées de la Cavalerie (annual armor conference), Paris, 12 October
2015, translated from French by the author.
19. Aline Leboeuf et Héléne-Quenot Suarez, “La politique Africaine de la France sous François
Hollande,” Etudes de l’Ifri, 2014, accessed 26 August 2016, https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/
etudes-de-lifri/politique-africaine-de-france-francois-hollande-renouvellement-impense.
20. Michel Liégeois, “Quel Avenir pour les Casques Bleus et le Maintien de la Paix?” Politique
Etrangère, Fall 2013, 65–78.
21. Hubert Lyautey, Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899), vol. II (Paris: Librairie Armand
Colin,1920), 129.
22. Stephen Watts and Stephanie Pezard, “Rethinking Small-Footprint Interventions,” Parameters
44 (Spring 2014): 23–36. A uthor’s note: A quick deployment can prevent the situation from escalating,
and French forces were able to deploy quickly to the CAR thanks to predeployed forces in Africa.

November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW