Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 80

staff constraints were significant, but units were still
able to maintain communications and a suitable level
of contact with local authorities.
This necessary spreading out of units on the
ground was also a challenge in terms of logistics. A
combined-arms company team required seven tons
of supplies per week (other than ammunition). This
meant delivery by C-130 aircraft was not enough.
However, a road convoy required four days for a
Bangui–Bouar round trip. During the rainy season
( June to September), forty-eight hours were needed
to reach the border with Chad from Bangui (350
kilometers).14 Moreover, these convoys took soldiers
away from other operational tasks. All this led to
considering airdrop delivery operations in case of
emergencies for isolated units. The issue was similar
regarding helicopters. Within one hour, one Gazelle
light-attack helicopter or two Puma medium-transport helicopters consume two cubic meters of fuel,
so long-distance flights required refueling on the
move. Logistics was a real constraint for operations,
and this situation necessitated the application of a
“strict-sufficiency” logic. This was especially true
since the Sangaris “tooth-to-tail” ratio was between
20 and 25 percent, which is considered a low level.15
Beyond these tactical adjustments, the Sangaris
operation was militarily effective because down to
the lowest levels, military leaders were able to implement a “comprehensive approach.” Indeed, company
commanders in remote areas, and sometimes even
platoon leaders, found themselves coordinating or
involved in administrative tasks, and they had to
manage without a court system.16 They improvised
and innovated. Battlegroup Scorpion established
local restoration and integration projects (chantiers
de rehabilitation et d’intégration locale), with the aim
to unite voluntary ex-combatants around a common
project while providing vocational training to help
with their reintegration into society.17 This was done
knowing there was no way to fully control such a
vast operational area, and so persuasion rather than
force was necessary.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Make sustainable actions to avoid having to come back.
Act swiftly to leave quickly.18
—Gen. Bellot des Minières
78

The French army’s current expeditionary model implies that France will deploy only modest contingents if
the vital interests of France are not at stake. However, if
some risks are accepted, using modest contingents does
not necessarily make the model inefficient. The problem is that in the context of a modest commitment, it is
difficult to transform military achievements into lasting
results. The French are far from being able to claim
victory, the roots of the Central African crisis are deep,
and normality in the CAR can only be considered from
a very long-term perspective. Sangaris’s desired end state
was to be able to hand over operations (in suitable condition) to an international force but not to create lasting
peace. Events in Mali and a new resolutely multilateral
and indirect French African policy have led to coordination between French operations abroad and UN peacekeeping operations.19 This division of tasks is not unique
to France and has become commonplace in the past
ten years. As a result, in the CAR, France intervened
in support of MISCA, and this cooperation is but one
example of French determination to implement confidence-building measures. The replacement of MISCA
by MINUSCA in September 2014 and the gradual
increase of MINUSCA’s troop level enabled Sangaris to
change its mission gradually. It became a reaction and
reinsurance force in support of MINUSCA, downsized
to nine hundred troops in June 2015.
Surely, this outcome creates ambiguities when
addressing the issue of how to evaluate the results.
Nevertheless, for France the main issue in such operations becomes the transfer of responsibility to partner forces, and, in particular, to a UN peacekeeping
mission that may offer the “critical mass” and operate
with a long-term perspective “where no one is willing
to keep troops.”20 This creates a real coordination challenge to ensure unity of effort among all these forces,
and it requires a significant investment in liaison
officers. Another issue is the questionable quality of
the troops that relieve the French forces.
We should not draw broad conclusions from the
Sangaris experience. As Marshal Lyautey wrote,
“There is no method …. There are ten, there are twenty, or rather if there is a method, it is called flexibility,
elasticity, compliance to places, times, circumstances.”21 However, adaptation measures taken by units
during this operation allow us to identify—beyond
the question of troop level—some effectiveness
November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW