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STAFF TRAINING
tactical triggers. During a platoon live-fire exercise, the
battalion integrated each warfighting function to conduct a combined-arms breach on terrain that replicated the Donbass region.
The staff continued to successfully plan and issue
mission orders during the command-post exercise and
company situational training exercises, applying the
knowledge gained during the foundational portions of
the training. By the end of the rotation, the Ukrainian
staff was capable of following the Army operations
process in a manner that would give them some degree
of NATO interoperability. They demonstrated remarkable progress in using the MDMP to produce mission
orders, conduct effective combined-arms rehearsals,
and apply mission command during a tactical exercise
in field conditions.
An important factor to this successful training was
using a variety of teaching techniques to keep the training audience engaged. The learning coaches attempted
to limit lectures by supplementing classroom instruction
with practical exercises, real-world vignettes, live-fire exercises, situational training exercises, terrain walks, and a
command-post exercise. Andragogy was integrated into
the action-learning model to create a learning environment optimized for the adult training audience.
Mission Success
Although the action-learning coaches were unable
to change the Ukrainian Army’s centralized post-Soviet mentality at the operational or strategic level,
action learning as a catalyst for change was successful
at the tactical level. Action learning could be applied
by national-level military advisers at the brigade level
and above. This approach could accelerate change by
delivering the training opportunity on a wider scale
while garnering senior-level support.
Coupling the bottom-up training of Ukrainian
rotational battalions at JMTG–U with embedded
action-learning coaches at the operational level
would maximize the effectiveness of the methodology. Action learning could support building warfighting function integration and staff capabilities while
promoting mission-command principles.
In Ukraine, the scope of training should be expanded to higher echelons to persuade senior leaders
to achieve enduring, transformative change. This case
study suggests that action learning and the andragogy
model can assist in changing cultural norms in the
Ukrainian army, and possibly with other forces in
Eastern Europe, while rapidly producing modernized
and NATO-interoperable formations.
Notes
1. Name withheld, Ukrainian airborne battalion deputy commander in discussion with the authors, through an interpreter, in
Yavoriv, Ukraine, March 2016. Discussions with Ukrainian officers
were conducted in confidentiality, and all names are withheld.
2. Name withheld, Ukrainian airborne battalion commander in
discussion with the authors, Yavoriv, Ukraine, March 2016.
3. Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2015).
4. Reg Revans, ABC of Action Learning (Surrey, England: Gower
Publishing Limited, 2011); Michael J. Marquardt, Optimizing the
Power of Action Learning: Real-Time Strategies for Developing
Leaders, Building Teams, and Transforming Organizations (Boston,
MA: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2011).
5. Michael J. Marquardt, “Harnessing the Power of Action
Learning,” National Science Foundation, T&D [Training and Development] 8, no. 6 ( June 2004): 26–32, accessed 15 August 2016,
https://www.nsf.gov/attachments/134059/public/PowerofActionLearning.pdf; Mary Stacey, “Action Learning: Addressing Today’s
Business Challenges While Developing Leaders for Tomorrow,”
Fresh Perspectives on Leadership Development (Toronto: Context
Management Consulting, Inc., 2007).
MILITARY REVIEW November-December 2016
6. Michael J. Marquardt, Optimizing the Power of Action
Learning.
7. Malcolm Knowles, The Modern Practice of Adult Education:
From Pedagogy to Andragogy (New York: Association Press, 1970).
8. See New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education,
Wiley Periodicals, Inc., accessed 7 September 2016, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291536-0717.
9. Barry Boehm, Spiral Development: Experience, Principles, and
Refinements, ed. Wilfred J. Hansen, Spiral Development Workshop
Special Report, CMU/SEI-2000-SR-008, (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute, July 2000).
10. Name withheld, Ukrainian airborne battalion chief of staff,
in discussion with the authors, Yavoriv, Ukraine, March 2016.
11. Name withheld, Ukrainian airborne battalion deputy
commander in discussion with the authors, Yavoriv, Ukraine, March
2016.
12. For the commander’s role in the operations process, see
Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations
Process (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2012). For the principles of
mission command, see ADRP 6-0, Mission Command (Washington,
DC: U.S. GPO, 2012).
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