Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 48
from behind or directly beside their combat vehicles
depicted little institutional change since the Soviet era.
Framing the Problem
The problem was further complicated by an overly bureaucratic tradition reminiscent of Soviet forces,
with little support for change at higher echelons and
narrowly defined roles across seventeen staff officers.
The Ukrainian officers were accustomed to being taught
what to think and not how to think. Communication
flow originated almost exclusively from the top, with
little bottom-up refinement or input. Under the Soviet
model, maneuver battalions were units of execution
instead of headquarters capable of detailed planning and
complex decision making. This arrangement limited
battalion commanders to only two or three decisions
during a typical combat operation, in which most battalion actions consisted of battle drills. The restrictive
command system greatly hindered the Ukrainian army’s
response to the hybrid-warfare conditions of antiterrorism operations in 2014.
Also exacerbating the situation were cultural norms
and behaviors exemplified by leaders afraid to admit
shortcomings or mistakes. This fear spiraled down to
subordinates, as false reports of readiness were the norm,
instead of truth and honest dialogue. Early in the training, one Ukrainian company commander stated outright that he would not tell his battalion commander of
existing problems. Instead, he would opt to tell the U.S.
PATT company commander, who would inform the U.S.
PATT battalion commander, who in tu rn would advise
his Ukrainian counterpart of the problem.
Under such conditions, the creation of a battalion
common operational picture becomes exCapt. Jacob Austin,
U.S. Army, is the
Headquarters and
Maj. Ryan Riggin,
Headquarters Company
U.S. Army, served as
commander for 3rd
the battalion execBattalion, 15th Infantry
utive officer for 3rd
Regiment. He holds
Battalion, 15th Infantry
a BA from CarsonRegiment. He holds a
Newman University
BA from the University
and an MS in orgaof South Carolina and
nizational leadership
a MBA from Liberty
from Columbus State
University.
University.
46
tremely difficult, and an incomplete or inaccurate
picture invites decisions based on faulty facts or assumptions. Consequently, Ukrainian staff officers typically
asked the trainers for definitive solutions to tactical
problems and struggled with the concept that well-analyzed mission variables and accurate staff estimates
could influence mission success. To the Ukrainians,
following the plan to the letter was more important than
achieving mission success. This situation was analogous
to how a Western army would view regulations. The
Ukrainians regarded straying from a Ukrainian doctrinal template similarly to how U.S. Army soldiers would
regard violating a regulation—a mindset that allows little
creativity and flexibility in a complex operational environment. This same rigidness extends to the Ukrainian
staff structure. Numerous majors and lieutenant colonels exist at the battalion level, but each is confined by
a narrow scope of responsibility, thus limiting any staff
officer’s influence on the commander’s decisions.
Developing an Operational
Approach for Training
To effect organizational change, the PATT applied
Army design methodology to frame the problem and the
desired end state.3 The primary difficulty in transforming Ukrainian leaders from a centralized, control-oriented command style resided in proving the benefits of
using staff analyses, empowering junior leaders, relying
on results-oriented mission orders, and building mutual
trust across the organization. The PATT’s Army design
process led to the adoption of two learning methods
to guide developing an operational approach to this
problem: action learning and andragogy learning. The
goal was to shape the Ukrainian battalion staff using
adult-learner fundamentals in a group setting, in a manner that would make each individual willing to adopt
new behaviors. Figure 1 illustrates how the PATT framed
the problem during its design process.
Developed by management expert Reg Revans in the
late 1940s, action learning is a dynamic, team-oriented
process useful for solving complex, real-world problems while teams simultaneously share experiences and
lessons learned.4 Public- and private-sector organizations continue to use it as a way to improve operations.
For example, human resource development professor
Michael Marquardt describes General Electric’s success
with action learning over about ten years, including
November-December 2016 MILITARY REVIEW