Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 47

STAFF TRAINING

political and economic strife mixed with in-depth
corruption and forfeiture of its nuclear arsenal (due to a
diplomatic agreement) degraded the Ukrainian military
to a shadow of its previous strength. Following unrest in
western Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014, pro-Russian separatists seized key government buildings in the
east in April 2014. Ukrainian forces, still operating under
antiquated Soviet military principles, began antiterrorism operations in the Donbass region in June 2014.
However, since increasingly large numbers of Russian
regular forces were covertly aiding the separatists, the
probability of successful antiterrorism operations was
limited. Moreover, a Ukrainian field-grade officer explained to the PATT trainers that the Ukrainians learned
during antiterrorism operations in eastern Ukraine that
the old system did not work. He said they would need to
learn a new way of fighting.1 Although most Ukrainian
forces withdrew from the Donbass region in early 2015,
some battalions are still being deployed for antiterrorism
operations as of 2016.
The ability to recognize and execute transformational change tests any large organization. The PATT
headquarters quickly observed that although Ukrainian
unit leaders were patriotic, hardworking, and dedicated
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2016

A BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle provides supporting fire to Ukrainian
infantrymen during a live-fire exercise for Joint Multinational Training
Group–Ukraine 23 June 2016 at the International Peacekeeping and
Security Center near Yavoriv, Ukraine. (Photo by Capt. Scott Kuhn,
U.S. Army)

to mission accomplishment, they adhered to a centralized-control organizational structure, thereby limiting
their ability to integrate warfighting functions. During
the first week of training, a shocked senior Ukrainian
officer asked the PATT instructors if they always allowed
company commanders to plan training and train wherever they wanted.2
Initial discussions with Ukrainian leaders revealed
that most warfighting enablers, such as mortars and engineers, were regularly employed independently from the
maneuver companies. Use of the battalion’s mortar battery consisted of direct-lay mortar fires with the battery
commander as the observer. The battalion had almost no
experience shooting the mortars in indirect-fire mode
while using forward observers to adjust rounds. Their
complete reliance on old Soviet order-of-battle techniques included static- and linear-defensive arrays with
predictable offensive maneuvers. Marching in column,
deploying formations on line, and infantrymen fighting
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