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MIGRATION AS A WEAPON http://www.nationalreview.com/article/430385/ cuban-refugee-crisis-fabricated-win-sanctions-repeal. 25. For an examination of an analogous phenomenon in the nuclear arena, see Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Ne gotiating Behavior (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999), especially chap. 3. 26. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 196. 27. Mark Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). 28. Ibid.; Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 43, 71. 29. Christopher Mitchell, “Implications,” in Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 30. This can be particularly important because powerful actors tend to dismiss weaker actors’ threats for two distinct reasons. First, they frequently have trouble believing their weaker counterparts would initiate crises or conflicts they seem destined to lose, based on relative capabilities. This tendency may be further exacerbated by the fact that targets may also underestimate the magnitude of the threats facing weak challengers when the issues at stake seem trivial to them, thus leading them to further discount the probability of crisis initiation. Second, because the majority of targets would not themselves initiate migration crises, they tend to dismiss threats to do so as “irrational” or “crazy” and, consequently, also incredible. 31. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002). 32. Valur Ingimundarson, “Cold War Misperceptions: The Communist and Western Responses to the East German Refugee Crisis in 1953,” Journal of Contemporary History 29 (1994): 463–81; D. G. Pruitt, Negotiating Behavior (New York, Academic Press, 1981). 33. Indeed, targets who engage in foreign-imposed regime change often inadvertently create conditions even more conducive to the employment of CEM after they have intervened to change the incumbent regime, as U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya in recent years makes clear. 34. Ibid., 6–7. 35. John Mueller, “The Banality of Ethnic War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 42–70. The use of regular troops is often not even necessary to effect population displacement; it can also be done with paramilitary “shock troops” and even bands of thugs, as the 1990s wars of imperial dissolution in the Balkans demonstrate. 36. James Gow, “Coercive Cadences: The Yugoslav War of Dissolution,” in Freedman, Strategic Coercion, chap. 11. 37. Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151–69; Bruce Russett, “Why Democratic Peace?” in Debating the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 93. 38. DOS Telegram No. 87, Control No. 15686, and “(Secret) Memo ‘Discontent in East Germany.’” 39. “Iran Threatens to Expel Afghan Refugees if Kabul Ratifies U.S. Strategic Partnership,” Telegraph, 12 May 2012, accessed 4 October 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9256602/Iran-threatens-to-expel-Afghan-refugees-if-Kabul-ratifies-US-strategic-partnership. MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2016 html. Fazel Hadi Muslimyar, speaker of the Afghan Senate, reported that the Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan threatened to expel Afghans if Kabul signed the partnership treaty with the United States. 40. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration; for post-publication cases and data, see Greenhill, “When Virtues Become Vulnerabilities: The Achilles’ Heel of Migration Social Policy,” in Handbook of Migration and Social Policy, eds. Gary Freeman and Nikola Mirilovic (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016); Kelly M. Greenhill, “Demographic Bombing: People as Weapons in Syria and Beyond,” Foreign Affairs online, 17 December 2015, accessed 6 October 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/2015-12-17/demographic-bombing. 41. Greenhill, “When Virtues Become Vices.” 42. Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 25–48; Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute, 2008). 43. It is of course also possible that if general deterrence succeeds and nothing happens, there still may be a large number of as yet unidentified cases of CEM-driven deterrence. It is well known, for instance, that Chinese fears of both the direct and indirect anticipated costs and potentially destabilizing effects of a mass migration of North Koreans into China has long deterred the Chinese from exerting greater pressure on the Hermit Kingdom on a variety of military and nonmilitary fronts, including its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its occasional regional acts of aggression. How many other such cases might invisibly exist (or have existed previously) is an open question. 44. Greenhill, “Migration as a Coercive Weapon.” 45. While just such an outcome will be a good thing if the challenger is, for instance, a nongovernmental organization trying to bring down a dictatorship, it is a highly undesirable outcome in most cases. 46. “The Construction of the Berlin Wall,” Berlin website, accessed 4 October 2016, www.berlin.de/mauer/en/history/ construction-of-the-berlin-wall. 47. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 89. 48. Ronald B. Frankum Jr., Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954-1955 (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2007), 207. 49. Ibid. However, attempting to “pass the buck” can also backfire by inadvertently permitting further—and more successful—coercion by enterprising opportunists. 50. H. Richard Friman, “Side-Payments Versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations,” International Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 387–409. 51. Of course, the converse is also true, should coercers aim to galvanize action within the pro-camp. That said, most research suggests that changing the prev ailing frame in policy debates is a difficult task. 52. Adrian Edwards, “Global Forced Displacement Hits Record High,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees website, 20 June 2016, accessed 4 October 2016, http://www. unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html. 53. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration, appendix. 35