Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 36
last decade alone, we have witnessed the consequences of CEM in arenas as significant and diverse as economic sanctions and arms embargoes, ethnic conflict,
military intervention, both intra- and inter-state war,
nuclear proliferation, and regime change. While for
many this is a phenomenon that has been hiding in
plain sight, its consequences and implications have
been anything but invi sible.
Notes
1. Ben Rawlence, “Refugees Shouldn’t Be Bargaining Chips,” New
York Times, 17 May 2016, accessed 6 October 2016, http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/05/17/opinion/refugees-shouldnt-be-bargaining-chips.html.
2. Elizabeth Collett, “The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Deal,”
Migration Policy Institute.org website, March 2016, accessed
3 October 2016, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/
paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal.
3. “EU-Turkey Statement,” The European Council website, 18
March 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.
4. Duncan Robinson and Alex Barker, “EU and Turkey Agree Deal to Return Migrants,” Financial Times, 18
March 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, https://www.ft.com/
content/94314ec0-eca7-11e5-9fca-fb0f946fd1f0.
5. Agence France-Presse, “Turkish President Threatens to Send
Millions of Syrian Refugees to EU,” The Guardian online, 11 February
2016, accessed 3 October 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/feb/12/turkish-president-threatens-to-send-millionsof-syrian-refugees-to-eu; Agence France-Presse, “Turkey Threatens
to Back Out of EU Migrant Deal over Visas,” France24.com, 19
April 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.france24.com/
en/20160419-turkey-migrant-deal-eu-visa-free-travel; Kelly M.
Greenhill, “Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and
Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis,” European
Law Journal 22, no. 3 (May 2016): 279–94.
6. Selena Sykes, “EU Does Secret Deal with Suspected War
Criminal in Desperate Bid to Stop Migrants,” Express online, 15 May
2016, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/
world/670550EU-secret-deal-war-criminal-Sudan-migrant-crisisAfrica.
7. “Australia Asylum: Why is it Controversial?” BBC News website, 3 August 2016, accessed 3 October 2016, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-28189608; Greenhill, “Open Arms Behind Barred
Doors,” 279–81.
8. Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced
Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2010).
9. This makes coercive engineered migration (CEM) significantly
less common than interstate territorial disputes (ca. five cases/year),
but markedly more prevalent than both civil wars (ca. 0.7 cases/year)
and extended intermediate deterrence crises (ca. 0.6 cases/year).
Seventy-five of eighty-six migration cases since 1951 were determined to be CEM.
10. See Greenhill, “Migration as a Coercive Weapon: New
Evidence from the Middle East” (forthcoming).
11. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration, chap. 3.
12. Michael Weiss, “Breaking: Syrian State Documents
‘Show Assad Orchestrated Nakba Day Raids on Golan
Heights,’” Telegraph, 13 June 2011; Rick Gladstone and Damien
34
Cave, “Torrent of Syrian Refugees Strains Aid Effort and
Region,” New York Times, 24 August 2012, accessed 6 October
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/world/middleeast/
refugee-numbers-swell-as-fighting-in-syria-intensifies.html;
David D. Kirkpatrick, “Syrian Army Attacks Village Near Jordanian Border,” New York Times, 6 September 2012, accessed 6
October 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/world/
middleeast/Syria.html.
13. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration, chap. 2.
14. Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in
War (Cornell University Press, 1996), 21. “The hope is that the
government will concede or the population will revolt.”
15. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3
(1988): 427–60.
16. Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes,” International
Migration Review 30, no. 3 (1996): 655–68.
17. “Russian Pundit Examines Central Asian Response to
Crimea Annexation,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17 April 2014.
18. Consider, for instance, the United States’ tragically underwhelming initial response to Hurricane Katrina.
19. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.”
20. Marc R. Rosenblum, “Immigration and U.S. National
Interests,” in Immigration Policy and Security: U.S., European and
Commonwealth Perspectives, eds. Terry E. Givens, Gary P. Freeman, and David L. Leal (Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Routledge,
2008), 15.
21. Marco Scalvini, “Humanitarian Wars and Rejected
Refugees,” OpenDemocracy website, 17 April 2011, accessed 3
October 2016, http://www.opendemocracy.net/marco-scalvini/
humanitarian-wars-and-rejected-refugees.
22. Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” in Strategic
Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), 29.
23. For example, while John F. Kennedy’s administration
was understandably reluctant to use force to influence Soviet
behavior vis-à-vis Berlin in the early 1960s, U.S. officials—at the
very least—entertained the idea of using CEM to “encourage”
greater cooperation from Moscow. See the partially declassified
“(Secret) U.S. Department of State (DOS) Telegram, From U.S.
Embassy Berlin (Deputy Commandant Allen Lightner) to U.S.
Secretary of State, ‘Refugee Problem May Deter Soviets from
Going Ahead with Treaty,’” 24 July 1961, No. 87, Control No.
15686; and “(Secret) Memo ‘Discontent in East Germany,’” 18
July 1961, 3. Both are available through the Digital National
Security Archive (subscription service).
24. Ian Smith, “Raul Castro is Launching a ‘Weapon of Mass
Migration’ Against the U.S.,” National Review online, 28 January
2016, accessed 3 October 2016, [continued next page]
November-December 2016 MILITARY REVIEW