Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 34

25

Projected total by 2020, if
current trajectory holds
N=at least 75 cases
(as of September 2016)

Number of coercive attempts

20

15

10

5

0

1951–60

1961–70

1971–80

OSS (other single state) targets apart from the United States

1981–90

1991–2000

2001–10

Multiple simultaneous state targets

2011–14

United States only
(© Greenhill 2015)

Figure 4. Change over Time in Target Distribution and Frequency
to navigate the political shoals represented by their
constituents’ mutually incompatible interests, either
by assuaging one or another camp through the use
of side payments or by changing mobilized actors’
minds about the undesirability of a given migrant
or refugee group through issue redefinition. In other
words, leaders may succeed in shifting domestic perceptions of the expected costs or benefits associated
with a particular influx.50 Third, targets may successfully threaten to launch—or actually do launch—military action to forestall or stop outflows at the source.
Indeed, sometimes they even use the threat of hypothetical outflows to justify military actions they wish
to take for other reasons. Sometimes targets simply
convincingly threaten other actions that convince
challengers to back down or end an outflow. When
evasion succeeds, coercion will fail, or at least be less
successful than challengers may have hoped.
Coercion can also fail because of missteps by challengers, some of which may also be successfully manipulated by targets. For instance, although such cases appear
to be relatively unusual, attempted migration-driven
coercion may unify the target’s population, rather
than polarize it. Similarly, if a group of migrants or
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refugees—previously viewed with skepticism or hostility—is effectively recast as the victim of gross human
rights abuses and worthy of protection, mobilized
opposition may evaporate, and with it, the possibility of
successful coercion.51 This is a key point, which reinforces the fact of the dynamic nature of this coercive,
two-level game. More broadly, whenever there are significant downward shifts in the level of mobilization of
(and degree of polarization between) pro- or anti-refugee
camps over time, coercion is likely to fail.
Nevertheless, as we have now seen, migration-driven coercive attempts occur on average at
least once a year, and, on average, they are relatively
successful when undertaken, particularly against
liberal democratic targets. This is particularly true in
th e domain of compellence, which comprises the vast
majority of cases of CEM. At the same time, as figure 4
suggests, even if the United States’ relative popularity as a target is currently ebbing, overall the average
number of cases per year may be creeping upward
(although these apparent trends may not endure). In
sum, while not a tool of first resort, under the right
circumstances, CEM can grant the last word to those
who employ it.
November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW