Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 29

MIGRATION AS A WEAPON

the vast majority of coercers have
not only been weak but also
8%
disproportionately illiberal, as
figure 2 illustrates. Why we have
Challenger weaker
11%
likely witnessed this distribution of coercers and targets is
Challenger stronger
explored in detail in the section
that follows.
In sum, in traditional military
Comparable or mixed
81%
coercion, the aim is to achieve
political goals “on the cheap.” In
Percentages are rounded,
CEM, by contrast, the general
based on seventy-five
determinate cases analyzed.
aim for weak actors is to achieve
political goals that would be
N=75 determinate cases
(© Greenhill 2015)
utterly unattainable through military means or, in a more limited
Figure 1. Relative Power of Challengers
number of cases, for powerful
and Target States
actors to achieve aims wherein
the use of military force would
be too costly or potentially escalatory, and hence, dangerous.23
For instance, the idea that states
19%
Democratic targets
such as Cuba, Haiti, and Mexico
could successfully coerce their
Mixed targets
neighbor, the United States, with
11%
the threat of military force is
Nondemocratic targets absurd. But doing so via the tacit
70%
or explicit threat of demographic
Percentages are rounded,
bombs is a different story. Indeed,
based on seventy-five
Castro successfully coerced the
determinate cases analyzed.
United States to the negotiating table three times using this
N=75 determinate cases
tool, most famously during the
1980 Mariel boatlift, but also in
(© Greenhill 2015)
1965 and, most significantly, in
Figure 2. Target States by Regime Type
1994–1995. Some have argued
that the current Castro regime is
threatened or mounting crisis, the anticipation of future
even now gearing up again as the country moves towards
pain and mounting costs has to be weighed against the
normalization with the United States.24
costs and opportunities associated with ending the crisis
immediately by conceding to the challenger’s demands.
Coercive Engineered Migration
As the aforementioned examples might suggest, this
as an Attractive (Asymmetric)
kind of coercion is most often employed by the relatively
Means of Influence
weak (in terms of power and capabilities) against the
Research on negotiating strategies of the (relatively)
relatively strong, as figure 1 indicates.
weak has revealed that weak state and nonstate actors
Of the seventy-five cases analyzed, the vast majority
often view crisis generation as a necessary precursor to
of targets of CEM have been liberal democracies, while
negotiations with their more powerful counterparts,
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2016

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