Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 26

and Turkey, which was concluded, as one observin Australia, in certain EU member states, and beyond.7
er put it, “with EU policymakers’ backs seemingly
However, future-focused claims about the precedents
against the wall, and in an atmosphere of palpable
that might be set by these “new” migration deals are
panic.”2 In exchange for permitting Greece to return to
curiously and potentially dangerously ahistorical. This is
Turkey all irregular migrants arriving after 20 March
because in point of fact the exploitation of refugees and
2016, the EU agreed to assist
migrants, which we might politely
the regime of Turkish President
The exploitation of
refer to as foreign-policy barRecep Tayyip Erdogan in
gaining chips—and less politely,
refugees
and
migrants,
meeting the mounting burden
as coercive weapons—is neither
of hosting approximately three
new nor novel. Moreover, neither
which we might politely
million refugees via provision of
is target state vulnerability to this
refer to as foreignmore than €6 billion in aid and
unconventional brand of nonmilincreased resettlement of Syrian
itary coercion, a fact that carries
policy bargaining
refugees residing in Turkey.3
significant operational and policy
chips—and
less
politely,
The EU also agreed to accelerate
implications.
visa liberalization for Turkish
as coercive weapons—
nationals and to “reenergize”
Mass Migration
previously moribund talks on
is neither new nor
as a Weapon
Turkish EU membership, both
Indeed, as illustrated in
novel. Moreover,
of which Turkey had been seekdetail in my 2010 book, Weapons
ing for years without success.4
of Mass Migration: Forced
neither is target state
Conclusion of the EU–Turkey
Displacement, Coercion and
vulnerability
to
this
deal followed a series of threats
Foreign Policy, using displaced
by Turkish officials that effecpeople as nonmilitary instruunconventional brand of
tively amounted to, “We’re tired
ments of state-level coercion has
nonmilitary coercion.
of waiting. Either concede to
long been a common feature of
our array of demands or face the
international politics.8 In fact,
5
migration-related consequences of failing to do so.”
this frequently asymmetric brand of coercion—i.e., coAlthough widely popular with some segments of
ercive engineered migration (CEM)—has been attempted
society within EU member states, both migration deals
at least seventy-five times since the advent of the 1951
have been widely criticized as inhumane, immoral, and
Refugee Convention alone; that is at least one per year
possibly illegal, particularly in light of creeping auon average.9 In that time, CEM has been undertaken
thoritarianism within Turkey and the fact that parties
by dozens of discrete state and nonstate challengers
to the Horn of Africa deal include despots such as
against at least as many disparate targets and, by exSudanese President Omar al-Bashir, a leader who has
tension, against an equally large number of victimized
been indicted by the International Criminal Court on
groups of displaced people.
charges that he directed a campaign of genocide, ethnic
Sometimes the coercive weaponization of population
cleansing, and other crimes against humanity during
movements has simply comprised threats to generate
the country’s Darfur conflict.6
outflows, such as former Libyan leader Mu’ammar
Arguably more important, however, is that in addiGaddhafi’s recurrent, colorful, and rather dramatic
tion to lambasting these deals on their own terms, critics
promises to “turn Europe black” if the EU failed to meet
have expressed concerns about what precedents might be his demands. Gaddhafi used this tool with varying
set by these seemingly Faustian bargains and what these
degrees of success in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, before
deals may portend for the future of refugee protection
fatally overplaying his hand in 2011. Although the EU/
more generally. Concerns about the future security and
NATO intervention in Libya that year was not primarstability of the regimes that host refugees are indisputably ily driven by this unique brand of coercion, Gaddhafi
valid, especially given recent developments in this regard
aggressively employed it against the interveners. He used
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November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW