Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 - Page 90

be feasible, but it is one example of the critical thinking young Air Force field grade officers need to support a rapidly changing Army. Additionally, many are pushing for the inclusion of MC in joint doctrine. If included as another option to centralized control/decentralized execution, Air Force leaders must make smart decisions on when and where to apply the new joint doctrine. Conclusion—Sustain the Momentum The connection between the Air Force and Army is at a high point. Friendships and sturdy working relationships forged over the last thirteen years of combat provide a stepping-off point for future operations. Both services have needs, and both services need each other. The Army is changing its structure and size. It is also changing its doctrine. A smaller Army with powerful BCTs employing unified land operations via mission command requires unique, well-thought-out support. The relationship between Bradley and Quesada provides the historical structure and “how to” precedent. The generals worked together to find solutions that benefited both the air and land arms of the U.S. military. Young Air Force and Army field grade officers should follow their example. Lt. Col. Jason Earley, U.S. Air Force, is a command pilot with more than 2,500 hours in F-15C and T-38C aircraft. He holds a BS from the University of Michigan College of Engineering, an MBA from Tourou University, and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Earley served as an air liaison officer for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, and has deployed in support of Operations Allied Force, Southern Watch, and Iraqi Freedom. He wrote this article in 2013 while attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Notes 1. Thomas Alexander Hughes, Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (New York: Free Press, 2002), 156. 2. Ibid. 3. Richard Muller, “Close Air Support: The German, British, and American Experiences, 1918-1941,” Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray and Allan Millett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, August 1998), 180. 4. Hughes, Overlord, 14. 5. Ibid., 144. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., 145. 9. Ibid., 146. 10. Ibid., 148. 11. U.S. Army Forces Command, FORSCOM WARNO to the HQDA EXORD 184-13: BCT REORGANIZATION, Fort Bragg, NC, 1. 12. Tom Vanden Brook, “Hagel Outlines Bleak Future for Pentagon,” USA Today, accessed 20 May 2015, http:// sequestration-budget-cuts-pentagon/2603997/. 13. FORSCOM WARNO, 1. 14. Ibid. 15. Muller, “Close Air Support,” 189. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid, 190. 18. Hughes, Overlord, 228. 19. Ibid., 151. 84 20. Ibid. 21. U.S. Army Chief of Staff, The Army Training Strategy: Training in a Time of Transition, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Austerity, 3 October 2012, 20, accessed 20 May 2015, http:// pdf/ATS.pdf. 22. 99th Air Base Wing Public Affairs, “Green Flag-West Fact Sheet,” Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, 12 July 2012, 2, accessed 20 May 2015, asp?id=19524. 23. Scott Hasken, “A Historical Look at Close Air Support,” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 2. 24. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 10 October 2011), 1. 25. Joint Publication ( JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 25 March 2013), II-7. 26. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 16 May 2012) 2-1. 27. U.S. Air Force, Volume 1: Basic Doctrine (Maxwell Air Force Base: Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 27 February 2015), chap. 5, accessed 22 September 2015, 28. Hughes, Overlord, 184. 29. Ibid., 286. 30. Ibid., 287. 31. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 8 July 2009). November-December 2015  MILITARY REVIEW