Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 87

AIR FORCE TAKE NOTE

unmanned aerial systems could
provide the initial firepower the
light infantry lacks. C-17s would
follow with Strykers, a few
heavily armored vehicles, and
attack helicopters. After fighting
a conventional force-on-force
engagement, the scenario would
transition to counterinsurgency
warfare typical of the hybrid
threat many expect to face.
Air Force pilots would practice
shows of force or nontraditional intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance. The Air
Force and the BCT would fight
together from home station to
mission completion. Just like
Quesada’s P-47, the Air Force
has all of these assets. Each of
these platforms already conducts annual training. Each of
these platforms already spends
precious defense budget dollars
(9th Air Force photo courtesy of the National Archives)
to train. Airdropping or airliftA P-47 Thunderbolt piloted by Capt. Raymond M. Walsh of the U.S. 406th Fighter Group is silhouing the entire BCT to California etted against an exploding Nazi ammunition truck he just strafed 23 June 1944 behind enemy lines
in Normandy, France. The image was taken by his wingman’s gun camera.
is not possible, and CAS might
not be available every day of
the BCT’s scenario. However, the benefits gained from
enemy forces in battles where there was little
practicing even with small company-sized elements
coordination between the Air Corps and the
would pay huge dividends in future operations.
ground forces commander.23
In his thesis on CAS in World War II, Maj. Scott
Hasken’s comments seem intuitive given the luxury
Hasken stresses the importance of detailed liaison as of hindsight and current joint doctrine. However, the
an aspect of any operational approach:
focus on detailed liaison was a new concept in the early
It was also in World War II where command1940s. It helped enable the World War II innovation of
ers began to learn that planning for CAS
CAS. What is the corollary to today? Have the Army
made a significant difference in the execution
and Air Force captured the lessons learned during
of air-to-ground operations. Those battles
thirteen years of war? Armed with facts about the “new”
and engagements that were planned thorArmy and with opportunities for continued joint trainoughly with the integration of the Air Corps
ing, Air Force leaders can transition some viable techin a ground attack role inflicted heavy damniques while avoiding stagnation by resting on others.
age on troops and material. These coordinated attacks also had a significant psychological
Army Doctrinal Changes Impact
impact on the enemy, and demonstrated
Air Force Leaders
tremendous potential as a way to conduct
The Army is not just changing its size and strucmore aggressive joint operations. Conversely,
ture—doctrine is changing too. In 2012, the Army
only marginal effects were achieved against
began releasing a new series of doctrine publications.
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