Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 - Page 74

Expansion of force structure is also not a course of action that will be pursued in the current fiscal climate, so the emphasis on active measures across the Army and the services is important. Funding at the current level is sufficient to maintain a capability that can be modestly expanded somewhat if the threat grows modestly larger than anticipated. However, if the UAS threat to tactical formations continues to expand exponentially as current trends indicate, the Army must seriously examine bringing a basic capability to brigade combat team formations that will protect them, or otherwise it must accept the losses that will follow. The services must reexamine joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and training required to defeat UAS capabilities. The emergence of the UAS threat has revealed that the Army does not have sufficient forces at all levels to combat it. Leveraging combined-arms air defense procedures, utilizing friendly armed UASs, and examining Army aviation’s role in C-UAS can help to alleviate the problem of insufficient UAS defense assets currently faced by the Army. The examination of current techniques can help maximize the effectiveness of existing air and missile defense systems and improve current organizational capabilities to execute essential tasks. This reexamination needs to lead to the development of a joint C-UAS concept, a joint C-UAS strategy, and an update of Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, to address the evolving threat in greater detail.16 The development of TTPs to improve interoperability among the services supports the joint integration of mission command. Current cross-domain detection and combat-identification efforts are time consuming, and C-UAS is dynamic. The most likely individual to come into contact with a small-threat UAS in the future will be a soldier on the forward edge of the battlefield. How will he or she know the unknown UAS is a threat? Neuenswander emphasizes the importance of good interoperability across all levels to counter the UAS threat in his 2012 article “Wargaming the Enemy Unmanned Aircraft System Threat”: If the soldier can confirm the UAS is a threat, this is the first step in the UAS defense kill chain. However, [lack of] interoperability can become a great obstacle in the process. Soldiers at the squad level do not have access 68 to an air picture and no standard service or joint air defense request system currently exists. The development of a Joint Air Defense Request System that would correlate visual detections from ground units and enable follow on engagement is needed.17 Services must pursue a common command and control capability to exercise control of the complex C-UAS environment. The U.S. Army has taken positive step with its ongoing development of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). The IBCS provides users with a fused, composite air picture for greater situational understanding and awareness, automated battle management tools to aid in engagement decisions, and an integrated planning capability that assists in C-UAS defense design.18 The planned introduction of IBCS in 2018 will allow Army air and missile defense elements to receive friendly UAS locations from nearby ground stations and to pinpoint aerial position reports from self-reporting UASs. It will also provide the force with a highly accurate and correlated common tactical air picture. The joint force needs to expand its exercises to address evolving threats. The joint force must refine its doctrine to address engagement authority demonstrated by C-UAS scenarios and match emerging technological developments. It must continue to evaluate its doctrine and TTPs, using exercises that include C-UAS scenarios to practice and refine the application of TTPs. A proactive approach to address the emerging UAS threat supports the vision of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who said, “the Pentagon must always have a watchful eye on the horizon, anticipating needs and gaps in capabilities before they become dire.”19 As the chief of staff of the Army also outlined in the Army Operating Concept, One of our most important duties as Army professionals is to think clearly about the problem of future armed conflict. That is because our vision of the future must drive change to ensure that Army forces are prepared to prevent conflict, shape the security environment, and win wars.20 By taking the proactive steps outlined above with regard to C-UASs, the Army and the joint force will be better prepared to prevail against a serious, imminent threat. November-December 2015  MILITARY REVIEW