Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 - Page 72

operating in the seams between the employment of artillery and mortars and the use of fighter aircraft. Consequently, effective C-UASs limit the enemy’s ability to impede fires, enabling a key component of the U.S. Army’s operating concept, which states, “the ability to deliver fires [both offensive and defensive] to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of maneuver and action across the range of military operations” is a required capability that the Army must possess to win in a complex world.8 Six Recommendat ions ( Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army) The AN/MPQ-64 A3 Enhanced Sentinel Radar System is the only 360-degree coverage air defense radar in the Army’s inventory. It features a 3-D X-band phased array antenna that provides an instrumented range of seventy-five kilometers. impact U.S. power projection globally in support of U.S. interests and allies. The lack of sufficient C-UASs also may have the secondary effect of limiting coalition participation in operations where an adversary fields a capable UAS threat. Levels of coalition involvement usually depend on the degree of importance of a particular mission to the vital interests of the coalition partner. Situations where there are minimal vital interests at stake for a coalition partner and greatly increased risk due to lack of C-UASs could potentially force the United States to spread thin its available resources by sharing what C-UAS capabilities it has, or to take unilateral actions. Fortunately, the nature of the UAS threat has already resonated with many U.S. allies, who are taking steps to improve their C-UAS capabilities. To ensure the cohesiveness of future coalitions, the United States must exercise leadership in developing C-UASs to stress the importance of such measures, as it did with the development of ballistic missile defense capabilities. Army Has the Lead for C-UASs The Army has the lead for C-UASs specifically associated with threats to land forces because of the significant impacts an unchecked UAS threat could have on it in the future. The employment of UASs provides a significant area-and-access denial capability, 66 Six recommendations for improving overall Department of Defense C-UAS capabilities follow. The Department of Defense should designate a service or an organization as the proponent for all categories of C-UASs. The proliferation of UASs employable in various land, air, and sea domains requires a common direction and joint action to unite future C-UAS efforts and to improve effectiveness. The actions of individual services are important, but a unified joint approach, similar to those taken to address ballistic missile and cruise missile threats, is needed. Applicable to the C-UAS problem, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin E. Dempsey stressed the importance of cooperation among the U.S. armed forces, stating that “improved cooperation hinges on viewing military problems from a comprehensive cross-domain perspective rather than viewing them through an individual service lens.”9 A joint solution is required to address the challenges of detection and identification in order to improve defeat mechanisms. A common definition of the threat, the establishment of a common threat database, and the establishment of a blue-force positive identification requirement will enhance identification and classification and will help reduce fratricide. In the case of UASs, everything is enemy—until proven friendly. Currently, multiple intelligence organizations are responsible for this mission, and they track fixedwing and rotary-wing UASs separately. Establishing a common UAS database, with a single intelligence organization responsible for its operation, would provide a considerable advantage for the warfighter. Timely detection is the critical requirement that leads to identification and classification. The joint force must take advantage of developing November-December 2015  MILITARY REVIEW