Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 56

These technologies are currently taught in military
schools but have yet to be assigned across all cavalry
squadron MTOEs in the scout role. As Lt. Col. Eric
Lowry wrote in a 2014 article, “Ten years of war in the
Middle East fighting an enemy that can blend into the
population have demonstrated the need for a more
thorough ability to find and positively identify that
enemy. The identification and destruction of enemy
support networks … [is a] vital aspect that supports the
Army of 2020.”15
The aforementioned sensors and other unmanned
surveillance technologies are examples of available
capabilities that would allow detachments from light
cavalry squadrons to more effectively identify and
target these enemy networks. They would also greatly
enhance a cavalry unit’s ability to fulfill information
requirements in future asymmetric warfare settings.
Cavalry squadrons of the future. The ideal light
cavalry squadron of the future will be prepared to operate in a decentralized manner, detaching teams of reconnaissance enablers to comparatively robust infantry
units. This recommendation fits well into the paradigm
of regionally aligned forces and small-unit deployments
for foreign internal defense. Teams and squads of light
cavalry scouts equipped with surveillance control
systems and specialized light vehicles—such as, perhaps, the light tactical all-terrain vehicle currently in
use by certain airborne units, or, further in the future,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s
proposed Ground X Vehicle—could add unique value
to infantry companies as currently provided by highly
coveted sniper teams.16 Rather than simply operating
an LRAS3 (typically used on an infantry vehicle such
as the Stryker or the mine-resistant ambush-protected
[MRAP] vehicles), these teams would include personnel qualified as joint fire observers and trained through
attendance at the Army Reconnaissance Course,
Pathfinder School, and Air Assault Schools. With light
vehicles and emerging technology, these teams can provide a capability outside the means of infantry. Rath er
than passively consuming sensor information through
viewing terminals, such teams could instead use sensor
and unmanned platform control systems to increase
reconnaissance coverage and produce complementary
surveillance value.
With a new MTOE, our light cavalry squadrons
could train and prepare these teams along with fellow
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information-collection assets, such as an unmanned
aerial surveillance platoon, a human intelligence
team, and interpreters, all readily available for
detachment to infantry companies. However, our
current light formations err too far toward heavy
and contiguous employment to operate along these
lines. Decentralizing our light cavalry squadrons
would allow the above-mentioned technology and
training capabilities to be distributed across the entire maneuver force as opposed to being condensed
within one formation. While bearing this in mind,
the Army of 2025 also demands a combined arms
maneuver capability—one that is best provided by
heavy cavalry.
Combined arms heavy cavalry. Current cavalry
squadrons equipped to provide armored warfighting
capabilities include those within the ABCT and the
SBCT. However, the lighter SBCT cavalry squadron
is less effective in this role for a number of reasons.
First, as practical experience has shown, the function
of this squadron performing standoff reconnaissance
as the tip of the spear for the SBCT and follow-on
ABCTs does not survive first contact with commonly
templated enemies. Employed within varied terrain,
the cannon and antitank guided missile systems of
even a small number of legacy Soviet systems, such as
the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle, contain sufficient
range and firepower to attrit an entire Stryker cavalry
squadron and thus degrade the operational tempo of
follow-on armored forces.
This employment dilemma calls to mind the similar invalidation of the pre-OIF brigade reconnaissance
troop concept, in which light cavalry scouts equipped
with high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
failed to maintain heavy brigade combat team operating tempo due to sustaining unacceptable losses.17
Second, couple this lack of Stryker cavalry survivability with the absence of robust, organic maintenance
or fueling capabilities—such as those provided by a
forward support company—and you have a formation
unlikely to be able to sustain operating tempo in a
future conventional, forcible-entry fight.
It would be far more effective to set unambiguous
priorities, to integrate this functionally light cavalry
force into a follow-on, dispersed, wide area security
role, and to employ more heavily armored ABCT
assets in a hunter-killer role at the forefront. In this
November-December 2015  MILITARY REVIEW