Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 47

MARNE

army only organized its larger commands upon mobilization in response to an emerging crisis because of
the great expenses involved.

What is counterinsurgency? Should counterinsurgency
be population- or enemy-centric? What is the proper
acronym or designation for counterinsurgency?).
Similarly, strident debates regarding military theoConclusions
ries of strategy and tactics during the era before August
On paper, the prewar German conception of mission
1914 were diverse and abstract, and war—before the
command championed similar concepts as the principles actual war—had become very theoretical. Many prediscussed above. However, a combination of leader inwar theories were tested during the first six weeks after
experience in leading large bodies of troops (which often
war broke out, resulting in reality—which had someled to caution when audacity was required), overly pessi- times been ignored during prewar debate—creeping in.
mistic and easily discouraged personalities at the highest
As in all wars, reality forced change.
level of German command, and the unreliable comIn the modern, technological age, such theoretical
munications technology of the day led to a poor use of
debates may also be leading to specious conclusions.
several mission-command
For example, the fog of
principles and the eventual
war is often now minwithdrawal of German
imized in importance,
forces to static lines.
theoretically mitigated
At the start of the war,
by the concept of