Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 45

MARNE

emphasized initiative, responded by going their own
ways.
The lack of information and apparent unresponsiveness from his field commanders in turn caused Moltke
to issue new directives that did not necessarily reflect
battlefield realities but instead resulted in responses to
news of Joffre’s counteroffensive with actions that, counterproductively, enhanced chances for Allied success.
Responding to this situation, as he refused to go to
the front himself, Moltke instead sent his equally conservative and pessimistic intelligence officer, Hentsch,
who, based on little accurate information, saw the situation as desperate. He subsequently manipulated Bülow
into retreating even while he was still attacking—an
action which then forced Kluck to do so as well.
However, the situation facing the Germans on
8 September was nowhere near as dire as Hentsch,
Moltke, and then Bülow believed. Kluck had defeated
the French Sixth Army on the Ourcq and had, at a
minimum, destroyed its offensive capabilities. The cavalry screening force in the gap between Kluck and
Bülow had greatly slowed the British advance.
While Bülow’s right wing was gradually giving
way to the advance of the French Fifth Army, his
left wing had crumbled the French Ninth Army.
Rather than a retreat, a simple reshuffling of the
German forces could have allowed the German
advance to continue while Moltke brought up
forces from his left. Instead, the Germans, upon
the advice of Hentsch, backed by the endorsement of Moltke, elected to surrender the initiative and retreat. One result was that the Germans
never really regained the initiative until 1918.

of uncovering his right flank, which partially explains
why he transferred so many troops to the Ourcq front.
On the other side, French Fifth Army commander
Gen. Charles Lanrezac, an intellectual and well-regarded peacetime officer, lost all aggressiveness once faced
with the uncertainties of war. Lanrezac proved to be a
poor subordinate that Joffre had to replace.
At a higher level, Joffre himself proved very aggressive in contrast to Moltke. Although his actions could
have resulted in catastrophe, despite previous failures
aggressiveness drove Joffre to attack on 6 September
along the Marne and Ourcq fronts when the enemy
was still successfully advancing or had previously
repulsed earlier counterattacks. The large and risky
French counteroffensive was successful enough to force
the Germans to withdraw forty miles because its very
aggressiveness frightened the German high command.
The Germans probably could have reshuffled their
forces and repulsed the counteroffensive, but at that
point they were basically fighting separate, disjointed

Accept Prudent Risk
Emerging aggressiveness on the part of senior
leaders, manifest in willingness to accept prudent
risk, appears to have been the key discriminating
factor leading to the outcome. While both the
Germans and French espoused assertiveness in
field commands, the actual fog of war tempered
this. During the first Marne campaign, an incomplete knowledge of the enemy’s deployment on
both sides led to a fear of encirclement. This fear
curbed aggressiveness and created excessive caution among the Germans and long retreats in the
case of the Allies. Even Kluck was at times fearful
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2015

(Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

French Army commander Gen. Joseph Joffre issuing orders in the field.

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