Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 15

URBAN INDIVIDUAL

and unsophisticated violence does not scare citizens out,
is within reach of unskilled and readily available fighters,
and merely requires anonymous general guidance, not
traceable real-time command and control. To paraphrase Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified
Land Operations, this type of belligerent lacks a clearly
defined organization on which his opponent can focus.21
An urban-based belligerent has no need to prevail in
combat when megaurban contention is sufficient to
force the opponent out.

Military Implications
The importance of popular support to conflictual
coexistence gives new meaning to the concept of initiative
in unified land operations. According to ADP 3-0—
To seize the initiative (setting and dictating
the terms of action), Army forces degrade the
enemy’s ability to function as a coherent force.
… Leaders continue to exploit the initiative
until they place the enemy in a position that
disables any ability to coherently employ
military capability. This continued resistance
can only lead to the physical destruction of the
enemy military potential and the exposure of the

enemy’s sources of power to imminent destruction
or capture [italics added]. These are typically
the military conditions required for the termination of a conflict on favorable terms.22
This understanding of initiative focuses on enemy forces. The underlying assumption is that the degradation of
the enemy’s military capabilities exposes his power sources
to destruction or capture. This assumption holds true for
all sources of power, except for the one that matters in
megacities: the protest potential of the population.
Therefore, urban-based belligerents have a different view on initiative. They focus on people. The fall of
Baghdad in 2003 clearly illustrates the different views on
the problem of seizing and holding cities in an urbanized
world. Upon entering the Iraqi capital, American forces
destroyed enemy capabilities, seized decisive terrain, and
secured critical infrastructure. By contrast, Moqtada
al-Sadr organized a pilgrimage to Karbala and took control of Baghdad’s religious and social assistance centers.23
Events after 2003 showed that al-Sadr’s initiatives resulted
in tighter control over large swaths of Baghdad than the
control exercised by the U.S.-led coalition.
The value of initiatives to gain control ov er the
protest potential of the population is limited not only

(Photo by Tara Todras-Whitehill, Associated Press)

Egyptians celebrate the news of the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak 11 February 2011 in Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt. “Arab Spring”
antigovernment demonstrations swept through the Middle East in 2011, leading to the successful removal of several dictators in the region.
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2015

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