Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 13

URBAN INDIVIDUAL

units to locate Chechen urban fighting positions and
destroyed them from safe distances using fighter aircraft,
artillery, and thermobaric rounds. Lacking a recruitment
pool to replace losses, attrition ultimately led to the collapse of the Chechen defense of their capital.
Although the Chechen concept of operations was innovative, it nevertheless reflected a vision that sees combat
as “the only effective force in war.” 12 This vision remains
rooted in nineteenth century military theory that holds
that “it is evident that destruction of the enemy forces is
always the superior, more effective means, with which others cannot compete.”13 In this line of thinking, using the
urban infrastructure as a battleground is merely another
way to gain a position of advantage over the enemy.
Conversely, the 2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza
shows that—above a certain size—cities offer fundamentally different options to the urban-based belligerent.
In unruly megacities, force requirements for population
control measures approach those needed for decisive
battle. In 1967, the Israel Defense Forces needed eleven
brigades to defeat the Egyptian army and conquer the
Sinai Desert—including Gaza.14 In the aftermath of the
Six-Day War, it took the Israel Defense Forces just a few
battalions to police the 350,000 demoralized Palestinians
living there.15 However, the population quickly grew and
radicalized. In one generation, Gaza transformed from
a conglomerate of villages into an extended urban area.

Activist movements such as Hamas continually mobilized
the 1.3 million Gazans in frequent and violent protests,
supplemented with occasional terrorist attacks. As a result
of rapid urbanization and increased contention, Israeli
force requirements for population control rose to nine
brigades.16 To contain Hamas, Israel had to field ever more
soldiers. In 2004, the Israel Defense Forces were fighting
almost the equivalent of the Six-Day War, week after week
with no end in sight. This situation proved unsustainable.
In an unprecedented decision, the Israeli government
designed a disengagement plan and asked parliament to
approve it. On 16 February 2005, the Knesset voted the
dismantlement of Israeli settlements in Gaza and the
unilateral withdrawal from the area.17
During the events that led to the takeover of Gaza
by Hamas, combat never was the effective force in war.
Likewise, belligerents who use the urban population as
a power source rather than the urban infrastructure as
a weapon system apply a fundamentally different form
of warfare than that described by classic military theory.
The mechanism urban-based belligerents use to win is not
combat—it is conflictual coexistence.

Conflictual Coexistence
In conflictual coexistence, gaining the support of the
megaurban population is the decisive operation. The
actual campaign of violence and contention is but a way to

(Photo by Ariel Schalit, Associated Press)

Thousands of Israeli protesters demonstrate 15 May 2004 in Rabin Square, Tel Aviv, Israel, rallying for a pullout from the Gaza Strip.
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2015

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