Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 12

the breakdown of administrative services,
causing citizens to flee the city. The resulting decrease of the urban population
diminishes the number of soldiers necessary to control the population. Moreover,
as the number of citizens goes down, the
effectiveness of standoff weapon systems
goes up, allowing the opponent to replace
soldiers with technology. Successful
urban-based belligerents swamp the
opposing force inside the city without
scaring the citizens out.

Weapon System or Power
Source
The August 1996 and January 2000
battles of Grozny illustrate that cities
(Photo by Shakh Aivazov, Associated Press)
offer the urban-based belligerent many
View of Leninsky Prospect in the Chechen Republic capital city of Grozny, Russia,
opportunities to escalate the level of
13 April 1995. Shelling and aerial bombardment by Russian forces during the previous January made it one of the most dangerous streets in the world.
violence against a militarily superior opponent.11 However, they also reveal the
size of the force needed to control the citizens living there.
limitations of such an approach. Grozny’s concrete strucQuinlivan demonstrated that two parameters determine
tures provided cover and concealment. Chechen fighters
force requirements to hold a city: population size and
used sewers to move around the city swiftly without
contention level.9 Comparing peaceful and conflict areas
exposing themselves to enemy fire. Defensive positions
around the world, he shows that—depending on the
on the upper floors of high-rise buildings denied the
level of contention—force requirements per thousand of
Russians the advantages offered by tanks because of the
population range from two lightly armed police officers
limited elevation of their guns. Moreover, narrow streets
in a patrol car to twenty heavily equipped and adequately
limited the Russian ability to maneuver and strongly
supported members of the armed forces. In megacities,
reduced observation and fields of fire. This allowed
this rule completely changes the character of urban warthe Chechens to fight at such close quarters that the
fare. That force requirements for urban combat are proRussians could not call in indirect fire support because of
portionate to population size rather than enemy fighter
the prohibitive risk of fratricide.
strength puts the urban individual in the center of strategy
In fact, Chechen fighters transformed Grozny’s urban
development. Because of the sheer size of the population,
infrastructure into one huge weapon system designed
an urban-based belligerent inflicts higher costs on enemies to deny the Russians the advantages they derived from
by mobilizing city dwellers against enemy forces than
their numerical and technological superiority. In 1996,
by directly fighting them.10 Therefore, the strength of
Chechen fighters succeeded in this. However, the princiurban-based belligerents resides in their abil ity to tune the pal disadvantage of such a high level of violence is that it
level of contention to an optimum level.
depopulates the city. In the case of Grozny, the populaLow levels of contention do not bother the opponent,
tion shrank from three hundred thousand at the outset
but extremely high levels of violence do not threaten
of hostilities to less than twenty thousand at the end. As
the enemy either. Above a certain level, acts of violence
more and more civilians left the capital, Chechen fighters
yield diminishing returns. Even though extreme violence
offered the Russians clearly defined geographic locations
increases the opponent’s force requirements for combat, it
they could focus on. Drawing on the 1996 lessons learned,
lowers force requirements for population control meaRussian armored and infantry troops no longer entered
sures. Extreme violence leads to rampant insecurity and
the city but sealed it off. They sent in small reconnaissance
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November-December 2015  MILITARY REVIEW