Military Review English Edition November-December 2015 | Page 11

URBAN INDIVIDUAL

belligerent protects his own while seizing the initiative to
attack his opponent’s. Because he saw the army as the real
source of Russian power, Kutuzov made the hard choice
to preserve his forces rather than protect the capital.
At that time, Moscow counted 270,000 inhabitants.
Now, the inhabitants number twelve million. In 1800,
3 percent of the world population lived in cities. That ratio
now stands at 50 percent, and trends indicate it will grow
to 60 percent by 2030. Taking into account the growth of
the world population from one to eight billion in the same
period, this means that the number of city dwellers will
increase more than one hundred fifty-fold in just over two
centuries.3 The scope of this evolution raises the question
as to whether the relative importance of armed forces and
cities as sources of power has remained unchanged. One
way to answer that question is to analyze what the incumbent Russian rulers consider the most dangerous threat to
their country and regime at this moment.
Two centuries after Borodino, the Kremlin states
that Moscow is once again under threat of an imminent
attack. In May 2014, Russian authorities organized an
international security conference entirely devoted to
color revolutions.4 During the conference, Gen. Valeriy
Gerasimov—chief of staff of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation—explained
his view on the ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych earlier that year: “Color Revolutions have
become the main lever for the realization of political ideas.
… They are based on political strategies involving the external manipulation of the protest potential of the population,
coupled with political, economic, humanitarian and other
non-military measures.” 5 In an earlier publication, he
wrote that “the rules of war changed substantially. The role
of nonmilitary methods to achieve political and strategic
objectives increased, and their effectiveness, in some cases,
exceeded that of armed force.”6 In the eyes of the Kremlin,
this type of regime change can happen at any time in
Moscow. Mass demonstrations in Mosc ow could be as
threatening to Putin as they proved to be to Yanukovych
in Kiev. President Putin therefore firmly stated, “We
see that the wave of so-called ‘color revolutions’ led to
such tragic consequences. … For us, this is a lesson and a
warning, and we must do everything necessary to prevent
something like this from happening in Russia”7
Although the Kremlin’s interpretation of recent
events indicates it refuses to differentiate between
spontaneous protests and orchestrated subversion, it
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2015

also shows the Kremlin considers urban mobilization a
power equivalent or superior to conventional military
force. Gerasimov’s estimate of the relative importance
of armies and cities clearly is the complete opposite of
Kutuzov’s. Other events corroborate this estimate. In
megacities like Cairo, Baghdad, and Gaza, military force
proved inadequate to contain popular mobilization. As
urbanization continues, this trend will only exacerbate.
However, the increased role of cities in armed conflicts is not due to the cities themselves but to the way
their numerous inhabitants interact. This article holds
that the source of power in future armed conflicts is the
protest potential of urban individuals. Therefore, rendering the enemy powerless requires its isolation from urban
constituencies at the outset of operations. This calls for a
renewed understanding of the first foundation of unified
land operations: initiative.8
To substantiate this thesis, the article first explains
the process of urbanization in the context of conflicts
and war. Next, it describes how urban-based belligerents
use megacities as strategic power sources rather than
advantageous tactical battlegrounds. It further analyzes
why gaining overwhelming popular support is the decisive action in megaurban conflict. Finally, it derives the
military implications from that analysis.

Urbanization
Twenty-first century megacities counting several
million inhabitants are not simply enlarged versions of
early nineteenth century cities with less than one hundred
thousand residents. Urbanization does not merely mean
that cities expand but that the urban character of the environment becomes the defining parameter of life itself.
In 1800, cities were small but densely populated areas
governed by a rudimentary administration and protected by a fortified perimeter. The defense of a city relied
completely on the value of the perimeter as an obstacle.
Once breached, the city was lost. Protracted resistance
inside the perimeter was impossible. As the effectiveness
of firepower against fortifications increased, the importance of cities in wars dwindled.
By contrast, contemporary megacities are large areas
with a high population density where life depends on administration. Perimeters in the shape of beltways enhance
rather than impede access to the center. However, this
does not mean that these cities are defenseless. On the
contrary, the defensive value of a megacity stems from the
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