Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 85

OPERATION SERVAL

The next 10 days were spent searching for enemy
positions around the city of Gao and in the Adrar des
Ifoghas range east of Aguelhok. The first improvised
explosive devices encountered by French and Malian
troops were either of crude design or were poorly
emplaced, but some caches yielded better-quality
components. Suicide vests were used by insurgents
both in Gao and in the Adrar des Ifoghas.
GTIA 1 was relieved by GTIA 3 and moved back
to France on 17 February. GTIA 2 secured Gao and
its surroundings. GTIA 3 and 4, together with elite
Chadian troops, tightened the noose from Tessalit,
Aguelhok, and Kidal around the Tigharghar hills in
the Adrar des Ifoghas.
The jihadists had the choice of dispersing in small
groups in the countryside or defending their sanctuary in the craggy Adrar des Ifoghas. The rugged terrain there made it very difficult to detect them from
the air. Therefore, Chadian and French ground units
had to pursue them on foot, advancing and clearing
the slopes under helicopter and artillery support from
truck-mounted 155 mm self-propelled gun-howitzers known as Caesars.11 These strikes destroyed the
jihadists’ fire support, consisting of towed Russian 122
mm howitzers (D-30s) and multiple-rocket launchers
(BM-21s).
On 19 February, an airborne pathfinder from
GTIA 4 was killed while clearing an enemy outpost in Amettetai valley.12 The next day, Chadian
troops clashed with a large group of jihadists in the
Tigharghar hills. With French air support, they
neutralized more than 90 jihadists—including some
leaders of AQIM—but 23 were killed in action, and a
few dozen were wounded during the fight and afterward when some jihadists blew themselves up at close
range. A French paratrooper was killed on 2 March

while assaulting an enemy position in the northern
sector.13
The joint French-Chadian operation in the
Tigharghar range lasted a few more days in very
difficult conditions due to the harsh terrain and the
punishing heat, but it led to the capture of large weapon and supply depots around the Amettetai valley.14
Military search techniques honed in Afghanistan
were very useful to clear the caves and caches scattered in the mountains.
However, the jihadist armed groups had not been
totally eliminated in the Adrar des Ifoghas. On 21
February, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device blew up a Chadian fuel depot in Kidal. Around
the same time, about thirty insurgents and suicide
bombers attacked Malian and Nigerian troops in Gao.
The French mechanized quick-reaction force from
GTIA 2, with attack helicopter support, eliminated
them. On 6 March, a French corporal—a member
of a liaison team to a Malian unit—was killed near
Imenas, 100 km east of Gao. This happened after his
unit successfully cleared a village in cooperation with
GTIA 2.15
March 2013. The Serval brigade maintained its effort in the north until the end of March, seizing large
quantities of food, ammunition, and improvised-explosive-device components from AQIM’s sanctuary.
The threat from improvised explosive devices was real
and caused the next two French deaths: a reconnaissance vehicle (AMX-10RC) driver on 16 March and a
special forces operator on 29 April, both with pressure-plate devices.
April 2013. In April, the brigade’s effort focused
on the area between Gao and Kidal, while Task
Force Sabre (special operations forces) carried out
long-range reconnaissance operations in the north

Recent French combat experience in Afghanistan contributed to—
λλHigh tactical proficiency and effective body armor and helmets that minimized French losses
λλHigh-quality medical support
λλUp-to-date combat support including fires digital equipment for tactical air control parties and helicopter pilots

Figure 6. Main Lessons Learned from Phase 2
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014

83