Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 84

The rapid advance of forces effectively disrupted the enemy due to—
λλRapid succession of air assaults and ground movements under constant air cover
λλA three-tiered sequence of special operations forces and airborne units seizing airfields, followed

by French and Malian ground troops, and then a handover to MINUSMA (United Nations Stabilization
Mission for Mali) units

Figure 5. Main Lessons Learned from Phase 1
On 29 January, airborne engineers were dropped
with runway-clearing equipment over Timbuktu
airport and cleared it of obstacles left by the jihadists.
Chadian and Nigerian forces moved from Nigerian
territory toward the eastern Malian towns of Menaka,
Ansongo, and Gao.
Expanded reach. In the last week of January, Gao
became the center of the French deployment, with brigade headquarters and support units moving 1,000 km
from the main aerial port of debarkation in Bamako.
Upon arrival of the mechanized GTIA 2, French and
Malian units began extending their reconnaissance
missions along the Niger River and toward the cities of
Bourem, Ansongo, and Menaka.
Lessons from phase 1, seizing the Niger bend. The
rapid succession of air assaults and ground movements
under constant air cover, including surveillance and
reconnaissance by drones (Harfangs) and maritime
patrol aircraft, greatly disrupted the enemy. The lessons
learned in Libya on targeting fleeing enemy were put to
good use. The aviation battle group carried out all possible missions from close-combat attack to reconnaissance and deep strike. They had a few helicopters hit
by small arms and machine-gun fire, but threats from
man-portable air defense systems did not materialize.
The rapid advance followed a three-tiered pattern:
special operations forces and airborne units seized key
airfields and then were joined by French and Malian
ground troops, which were in turn relieved by units
of the United Nations Stabilization Mission for Mali
(Mission des Nations Unies de Stabilisation au Mali,
known as MINUSMA) on their previous positions.
Logistical support had to follow quickly over hundreds
of kilometers, making secured airfields key objectives
for air resupply. Communications and information
systems were strained to their limits on these unusually large distances. Satellite communications were key,
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but they were in short supply. Figure 5 summarizes the
main lessons learned from phase 1.

Phase 2, Clearing the Gao Region
and the Ifoghas Mountains
(8 February to 1 May 2013)
While ground troops were seizing the main towns
on the Niger River, fighter aircraft and helicopters
struck logistics depots and training centers further
north around Aguelhok and Tessalit. There, the Serval
brigade maintained a high operational tempo in order
to disrupt the enemy.
On 30 January, French special operations forces
and airborne units made an assault landing on Kidal
airfield, at the foot of the Adrar des Ifoghas range.
Chadian forces moved from Menaka to join them.
February 2013. On 1 February, the first armored
squadron of GTIA 3 was airlifted from France to
Niamey, Niger, and immediately headed towards Gao,
400 km away.
The second week of Febru \