Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 82

Maintaining legacy French bases in Africa provided—
λλSecurity for French expatriates and others
λλTraining opportunities and an expeditionary mentality for French forces
λλEnhanced joint cooperation among small units over large areas
λλKnowledge of local cultures due to long-standing presence of French instructors
λλInteroperability with local forces
λλUnderstanding of the operational environment and interaction with local populations
Figure 3. Main Lessons Learned From the First Part of Phase 0
the First Foreign Legion Cavalry Regiment—which was
finishing its four-month tour of duty in Chad and was
airlifted with less than 24 hours’ notice into Mali. The
GTIA 1 was reinforced within 48 hours by another
armored squadron of ERC 90s that drove more than
1,000 km from Abidjan (in Ivory Coast) to Bamako
and another Marine infantry company on Guépard
alert that was airlifted from France. A small headquarters element came from the French elements in Senegal
to ensure coordination and communications at the
operational level. (Figure 2 depicts the origins of the deployed units and the distances they had to travel.)
Lessons from phase 0 initial reaction and force
build-up. The preliminary part of the operation
demonstrated the value of maintaining legacy French
bases in Africa. These bases not only provide a guarantee of security for French expatriates and many
others, but also superior training opportunities and an
expeditionary mentality for the troops deployed there.
French forces had learned to leverage joint cooperation

of small units over large areas and had become used to
moving quickly and lightly. The long-standing presence
of French instructors across western Africa had developed a refined knowledge of the human terrain and a
certain amount of interoperability with local forces.
This, in turn, allowed better interaction with local
leaders and populations, providing invaluable insight
into the operational environment. Figure 3 summarizes
the main lessons learned from the initial reaction and
force buildup.
Concerning contributions of allies, Serval proved
that it is easier nowadays to get planes than men. The
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other NATO partners provided tactical and strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, or intelligence assets.10 Belgium
provided two medical evacuation helicopters. Other
ground contributions were promised for the European
Union Training Mission, but not for Operation Serval.
Nonetheless, these contributions proved critical for the
operation. Logistics assets moved 12,000 metric tons of
equipment by train, ship, air, or flatbed trucks in one
month—roughly the equivalent of what was repatriated to France from Afghanistan over a one-year period.

Phase 0, Blocking the Jihadists
(11 to 21 January 2013)

A French soldier meets with local residents, 11 February 2013, during Operation Serval in Mali.
(Photo courtesy of Defense Staff, French Ministry of Defense)

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Supported by French aircraft flying out of France
or Chad, GTIA 1 secured the Bamako airport and
moved north and east to block the jihadists’ advance.
Meanwhile, three more GTIAs, an aviation battle
group (groupe aéromobile), and a brigade headquarters
were deployed.
On 15 January, a company team was sent to seize
the bridge over the Niger River at Markala, (250 km
east of Bamako). On 18 January, Malian forces, with
November-December 2014  MILITARY REVIEW