Military Review English Edition November-December 2014 | Page 35

LOSING OUR WAY

Taken together, these statements imply that security operations do not include screen, guard, and cover.
Certainly, there is no association between these missions and cavalry organizations. Indeed, FM 3-20.96,
Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron, highlighted the
capability limitations of the cavalry squadrons of the
modular BCTs, directing that the “squadrons of the
BCTs and BFSBs must focus their efforts and mission
sets on reconnaissance.”17 Such doctrinal guidance
marked a retreat from the once clear emphasis placed
on the importance of a dedicated organization capable of providing reconnaissance and security for each
offensive and defensive task required of ground forces.18
These recent doctrinal publications reflect experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq where area security and
the protection of key facilities, individuals, and major
travel arteries predominated. Hence, in the Army’s
collective consciousness, security entailed area security,
convoy escort, and route security. These missions were
performed universally and did not mandate a specially trained organization. The publication of ADRP
3-90 and FM 3-90-2 confirmed this trend in doctrine.
Security became the province of all units, regardless of
their training, configuration, or METL.
BCT commanders and staffs are not prompted to
think of their squadron as a reconnaissance and security organization that can and should be used to perform
screen, guard, and cover tasks. That some commanders
have, in fact, done so reflects knowledge of past practices. As this knowledge fades, BCT commanders will
be less inclined to focus their cavalry squadrons on
these tasks unless provoked by the immediate needs
of their mission. Consequently, such tasks will not be
performed, or combined arms battalions will perform
them at the expense of BCT combat power.
With security missions considered a universal responsibility for all ground forces, information collection remained as the primary task of reconnaissance
and security organizations that required specialized
training. This change is noteworthy, since similar past
efforts have not fared well. In World War II, mechanized cavalry doctrine also focused on the singular
purpose of reconnaissance.19 This exclusive orientation
did not survive contact with the operational realities of
overseas deployment or field commander needs for security missions. Subsequent analysis of reconnaissance
operations in World War II found security missions
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2014

to be common, while pure reconnaissance missions
divorced from other mission types were exceptional.20 Consequently, reconnaissance doctrine from the
postwar era to the emergence of the RSTA squadron
stressed reconnaissance and security, underscoring
their interrelation and the importance of each.

Future Requirements and the Need
for Change
Ironically, some doctrinal publications now under
development will reaffirm the importance of screen,
guard, and cover missions; the critical relationship
between reconnaissance and security; and the inherent
value of cavalry organizations properly trained and
configured to do both.21 The Army needs to resolve
the doctrinal ambivalence of the higher manuals,
correct the descriptions of cavalry missions in Force
Management System Web, and ensure coherent guidance for the execution of information collection and
screen, guard, and cover from the overarching guidance
in the senior manuals down to the detailed coverage
provided in subordinate FMs and Army techniques
publications. An emphasis on reconnaissance and
security must once again replace reconnaissance and
surveillance in doctrine, training, and mindset. Clarity
of concept must replace doctrinal inconsistency to
ensure the proper use of cavalry organizations.
The Army’s shift in orientation from the COINonly focus of the last decade toward a broader range
of warfighting capabilities and potential operational
environments make such clarity imperative. Efforts to
regain core competencies in every branch are under
way, and the combat training centers are hosting training rotations necessitating combined arms maneuver
and mastery of the related skill sets. The learning curve
has proven steep for units that have completed decisive
action training environment rotations, often reflecting
a general incomprehension of basic reconnaissance and
security principles. Fixing doctrinal inconsistencies
related to security missions would facilitate the force’s
comprehension of those missions, enable more effective
training, and ensure that related concept development
would properly reflect cavalry’s reconnaissance and
security role.
Such corrective measures are critical to the successful development of the reconnaissance and security
BCT. In 2012, division and corps commanders reached
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